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In search for rules that secure gains from cooperation: the heuristic value of social dilemmas for normative institutional economics

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  • Martin Petrick
  • Ingo Pies

Abstract

We ask how normative statements are possible within an economic theory framework that recognises the importance of institutional arrangements. Instead of applying established outcome-oriented criteria of social welfare, we examine whether the rules of economic interaction allow the acquisition of gains from cooperation. We suggest to reconstruct any interaction as an existing or repealed social dilemma. This approach helps to identify common rule interests which create room for improvement of all parties involved, and to suggest desirable institutional reforms. Our policy applications include credit markets in developing countries and the unemployment problem in Europe.
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  • Martin Petrick & Ingo Pies, 2007. "In search for rules that secure gains from cooperation: the heuristic value of social dilemmas for normative institutional economics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 251-271, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:23:y:2007:i:3:p:251-271
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-007-9014-x
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    1. Pies, Ingo, 2009. "Die Entwicklung der Unternehmensethik - Retrospektive und prospektive Betrachungen aus Sicht der Ordonomik," Discussion Papers 2009-11, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    2. Pies Ingo & Wockenfuß Christof, 2008. "Armutsbekämpfung versus Demokratieförderung: Wie lässt sich der entwicklungspolitische Trade-Off überwinden? / Poverty reduction versus democracy promotion? How to overcome the trade-off in developmen," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 59(1), pages 405-440, January.
    3. Petrick, Martin, 2008. "Theoretical and methodological topics in the institutional economics of European agriculture. With applications to farm organisation and rural credit arrangements," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Transition Economies, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), volume 45, number 92318.
    4. Valentinov, Vladislav & Baum, Sabine, 2008. "The institutional economics of rural development: Beyond market failure," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 9(3), pages 457-462.
    5. Pies, Ingo & Wockenfuß, Christof, 2008. "Armutsbekämpfung versus Demokratieförderung: Wie lässt sich der entwicklungspolitische Trade-Off überwinden?," Discussion Papers 2008-3, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    6. Wockenfuß, Christof, 2009. "Demokratie durch Entwicklungskonkurrenz," Discussion Papers 2009-17, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    7. Pies, Ingo & Hielscher, Stefan & Beckmann, Markus, 2008. "Corporate citizenship as stakeholder management: An ordonomic approach to business ethics," Discussion Papers 2008-4, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    8. Pies, Ingo & Beckmann, Markus & Hielscher, Stefan, 2007. "Mind the Gap! - Ordonomische Überlegungen zur Sozialstruktur und Semantik moderner Governance," Discussion Papers 2007-16, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    9. Pies, Ingo & Beckmann, Markus & Hielscher, Stefan, 2012. "The political role of the business firm: An ordonomic concept of corporate citizenship developed in comparison with the Aristoleian idea of individual citizenship," Discussion Papers 2012-1, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    10. Beckmann, Markus & Pies, Ingo & von Winning, Alexandra, 2012. "Passion and compassion as strategic drivers for sustainable value creation: An ordonomic perspective on social and ecological entrepreneurship," Discussion Papers 2012-22, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    11. Pies, Ingo & Beckmann, Markus & Hielscher, Stefan, 2009. "Sozialstruktur und Semantik - Ordonomik als Forschungsprogramm in der modernen (Welt-)Gesellschaft," Discussion Papers 2009-6, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    12. Pies, Ingo, 2009. "Das ordonomische Forschungsprogramm," Discussion Papers 2009-7, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    13. Rüdiger Waldkirch & Matthias Meyer & Karl Homann, 2009. "Accounting for the Benefits of Social Security and the Role of Business: Four Ideal Types and Their Different Heuristics," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 89(3), pages 247-267, November.
    14. Gramzow, Andreas, 2009. "Rural development as provision of local public goods: Theory and evidence from Poland," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Transition Economies, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), volume 51, number 92313.
    15. Vladislav Valentinov & Lioudmila Chatalova, 2016. "Institutional Economics and Social Dilemmas: a Systems Theory Perspective," Systems Research and Behavioral Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(1), pages 138-149, January.
    16. Pies, Ingo, 2013. "The ordonomic approach to order ethics," Discussion Papers 2013-20, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    17. Petrick, Martin, 2013. "Reversing the rural race to the bottom: an evolutionary model of neo-endogenous rural development," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 40(4), pages 707-735.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social dilemma; Institutional economics; Normative economics; Policy advice; Labour market; Rural credit market; D02; D63; D74;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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