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In search for rules that secure gains from cooperation: the heuristic value of social dilemmas for normative institutional economics

  • Martin Petrick

    ()

  • Ingo Pies

    ()

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10657-007-9014-x
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Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 23 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 251-271

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Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:23:y:2007:i:3:p:251-271
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100264

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  1. Coco, G., 1998. "On the Use of Collateral," Discussion Papers 9805, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  2. Bell, Clive, 1988. "Credit markets and interlinked transactions," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Hollis Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 763-830 Elsevier.
  3. Alexander Spermann, 1999. "Fighting Long-Term Unemployment with Targeted Employment Subsidies: Benefit Transfer Programme (BTP) versus Targeted Negative Income Tax (TNIT)," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 218(5+6), pages 647-657, May.
  4. Demsetz, Harold, 1969. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, April.
  5. Ghatak, M. & Guinnane, T.W., 1998. "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Papers 791, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  6. Snower, Dennis J., 1994. "The Simple Economics of Benefit Transfers," CEPR Discussion Papers 1086, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Assar Lindbeck & Dennis J. Snower, 2001. "Insiders versus Outsiders," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 165-188, Winter.
  8. Petrick, Martin, 2004. "Credit rationing of Polish farm households: a theoretical and empirical analysis," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Central and Eastern Europe, Leib­niz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO), volume 26, number 93022, October.
  9. James M. Buchanan, 2004. "The Status of the Status Quo," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 133-144, 06.
  10. Petrick, Martin, 2004. "Governing structural change and externalities in agriculture: toward a normative institutional economics of rural development," IAMO Discussion Papers 73, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO).
  11. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  12. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, June.
  13. Eggertsson, Thrainn, 1998. " Limits to Institutional Reforms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(1), pages 335-57, March.
  14. Pies, Ingo, 2001. "Eucken und von Hayek im Vergleich," Untersuchungen zur Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen;Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg, Germany, edition 1, volume 43, number urn:isbn:9783161476365.
  15. Buchanan, James M, 1975. "A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(2), pages 225-30, May.
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