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The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Roland Kirstein

    (Uni-Saarland)

  • Stefan Voigt

    (Uni-Saarland)

Abstract

This paper explores the conditions under which compliance with a social contract establishes an equilibrium in a society. It is assumed that society consists of two groups, one of which has a comparative advantage in using violence, whereas the other one has a comparative advantage in producing a private good. Violence can be used to produce security as well as to exploit the weaker group. Yet, exploitation is limited: it reduces the incentives of the exploited group to produce the private good and increases the chances of a revolution. A social contract consists of the exchange of security against a share of the private good, produced at a high level of effort. The model not only allows the derivation of conditions for either compliance or exploitation to occur, but also sheds light on the transition from one form of government to the other. Hence, it contributes to Positive Constitutional Economics, i.e., the research program that is interested in explaining the emergence and the change of constitutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Roland Kirstein & Stefan Voigt, "undated". "The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2001-default/2001/1-1020, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  • Handle: RePEc:bep:dewple:2001-default/2001/1-1020 Note: oai:bepress:
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Wockenfuß, Christof, 2009. "Demokratie durch Entwicklungskonkurrenz," Discussion Papers 2009-17, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    2. Petros Sekeris, 2011. "Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 237-258, September.
    3. Wockenfuß Christof, 2010. "Demokratie durch Entwicklungskonkurrenz. Ein ordnungspolitischer Beitrag zur internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit / Democracy Through Development Competition. An Ordo-Liberal Perspective on the ," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 61(1), pages 325-352, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    self-enforcing contracts; rule of law; dictatorship; autocracy; Positive Constitutional Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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