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Nasty or Nice?

Author

Listed:
  • Bruce Bueno De Mesquita

    (Hoover Institution, Stanford University)

  • Randolph M. Siverson

    (Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis)

Abstract

A large amount of recent research points to the importance of domestic political institutions in shaping foreign policy, most of it turning on the distinction between democratic and nondemocratic regimes. However, fundamental characteristics differentiate regime types beyond the distinction between democratic and nondemocratic. Drawing a distinction between institutional differences that result from variation in the sizes of selectorates and winning coalitions, the authors consider the effect that regime type has on the prospects that a foreign leader will be removed from office following a military defeat, be it in a war or some lesser level of violence. The authors show that the distinction, now common in the literature, between democratic and nondemocratic regimes is not adequate for understanding the linkages between domestic and foreign affairs. A model is presented from which nine hypotheses are derived. A preliminary test of one hypothesis is presented, the results of which are consistent with the expectation that regimes, and consequently their leaders, will be the issue of conflict when power differences are great and the winning state has either a large winning coalition or a small selectorate.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce Bueno De Mesquita & Randolph M. Siverson, 1997. "Nasty or Nice?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 175-199, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:41:y:1997:i:1:p:175-199
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002797041001008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ray, Edward John, 1987. "The Impact of Special Interests on Preferential Tariff Concessions by the United States," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(2), pages 187-193, May.
    2. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno & Siverson, Randolph M., 1995. "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 841-855, December.
    3. Lake, David A., 1992. "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(1), pages 24-37, March.
    4. Wintrobe, Ronald, 1990. "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 849-872, September.
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