Voters elect politicians who closely matched their preferences
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- David Stadelmann & Marco Portmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2013. "Voters elect politicians who closely matched their preferences," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1001-1009.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Direct Democracy: Politico-economic Lessons from Swiss Experience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 338-342, May.
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- repec:bla:kyklos:v:70:y:2017:i:1:p:42-69 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bernd Hayo & Florian Neumeier, 2017.
"Public Attitudes toward Fiscal Consolidation: Evidence from a Representative German Population Survey,"
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 42-69, February.
- Bernd Hayo & Florian Neumeier, 2013. "Public Attitudes Toward Fiscal Consolidation: Evidence from a Representative German Population Survey," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201351, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Bernd Hayo & Florian Neumeier, 2014. "Public Attitudes Toward Fiscal Consolidation: Evidence from a Representative German Population Survey," Working Papers CEB 14-006, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Stadelmann, David & Portmann, Marco & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2014.
"Full Transparency of Politicians' Actions Does Not Increase the Quality of Political Representation,"
Journal of Experimental Political Science,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(01), pages 16-23, March.
- David Stadelmann & Marco Portmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2013. "Full transparency of politicians' actions does not increase the quality of political representation," CREMA Working Paper Series 2013-17, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
More about this item
KeywordsRetrospective Voting; Voting Behavior; Representation; Constituents? Preferences;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-07-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2012-07-29 (Positive Political Economics)
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