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Full transparency of politicians' actions does not increase the quality of political representation

Author

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  • David Stadelmann
  • Marco Portmann
  • Reiner Eichenberger

Abstract

We identify the impact of transparency in political decision -making on the quality of political representation with a difference- in-difference strategy. The quality of political representation is measured by observed divergence of parliamentary decisions from revealed voter preferences on the very same issues. Full transparency of votes of individual politicians does not decrease divergence from voter preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • David Stadelmann & Marco Portmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2013. "Full transparency of politicians' actions does not increase the quality of political representation," CREMA Working Paper Series 2013-17, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  • Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2013-17
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andrea Prat, 2005. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 862-877, June.
    2. Garrett, Thomas A, 1999. "A Test of Shirking under Legislative and Citizen Vote: The Case of State Lottery Adoption," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 189-208, April.
    3. David Stadelmann & Marco Portmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2013. "Voters elect politicians who closely matched their preferences," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1001-1009.
    4. Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Direct Democracy: Politico-economic Lessons from Swiss Experience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 338-342, May.
    5. John Carey & Simon Hix, 2013. "District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: a comment and reinterpretation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 139-148, January.
    6. Justin Fox, 2007. "Government transparency and policymaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 23-44, April.
    7. Alois Stutzer & Michael Zehnder, 2013. "Is camera surveillance an effective measure of counterterrorism?," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(1), pages 1-14, February.
    8. Matsusaka, John G., 2010. "Popular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 5(2), pages 133-167, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Portmann, Marco & Stadelmann, David & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2019. "Incentives dominate selection," Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203559, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Transparency; quality of political decisions; representation; parliament; individual votes; referenda;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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