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Contractual Institutions, Financial Development and Vertical Integration: Theory and Evidence

  • Rocco Macchiavello

This paper presents an industry equilibrium model of vertical integration under contractual imperfections with specific input suppliers and external investors.� I assume that vertical integration economizes on the needs for contracts with specific input suppliers at the cost of higher fixed costs.� I show that contractual frictions with external investors affect vertical integration through two opposing channels whose relative intensities depend on other determinants of firms size distribution in the industry.� Using cross-country-industry data, I present novel evidence on the institutional determinants of international differences in vertical integration which is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.� In particular, I show that countries with more developed financial systems are relatively more vertically integrated in industries that employ a high share of workers in large firms.

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File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper392.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 392.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2008
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:392
Contact details of provider: Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
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