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Vertical Integration and Investor Protection in Developing Countries

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  • Macchiavello, Rocco

Abstract

The industrial organization of developing countries is characterized by the pervasive use of subcontracting arrangements among small, financially constrained firms. This paper asks whether vertical integration relaxes those financial constraints. It shows that vertical integration trades off the benefits of joint liability against the costs of rendering the supply chain more opaque to external investors. In contrast to the commonly held view that pervasive input and capital market imperfections are conducive to vertical integration, the model predicts that the motives for vertical integration are not necessarily higher in developing countries. In particular, vertical integration is more likely to arise at intermediate levels of investor protection and better contract enforcement with suppliers reduces vertical integration only if financial markets are sufficiently developed. Evidence supporting both predictions is discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Macchiavello, Rocco, 2009. "Vertical Integration and Investor Protection in Developing Countries," Institutions and Markets Papers 55285, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemim:55285
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.55285
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    2. Amirah El-Haddad, 2023. "Political Patronage and Economic Opportunity: Vertical Integration in Egyptian Textiles and Clothing," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 35(5), pages 1224-1257, October.
    3. Herkenhoff, Philipp & Krautheim, Sebastian & Semrau, Finn Ole & Steglich, Frauke, 2024. "Corporate Social Responsibility along the global value chain," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    4. Rud, Juan Pablo, 2012. "Infrastructure regulation and reallocations within industry: Theory and evidence from Indian firms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 116-127.
    5. Liverpool-Tasie, Lenis Saweda & Dillon, Andrew & Bloem, Jeffrey R. & Adjognon, Guigonan Serge, 2022. "Private sector promotion of climate-smart technologies: Experimental evidence from Nigeria," IFPRI discussion papers 2155, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    6. Du, Julan & Lu, Yi & Tao, Zhigang, 2012. "Contracting institutions and vertical integration: Evidence from China’s manufacturing firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 89-107.
    7. Amirah El-Haddad, 2013. "Political Patronage and Economic Opportunity: The Case of Vertical Integration in the Egyptian Clothing Industry," Working Papers 797, Economic Research Forum, revised Nov 2013.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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