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Competitive and Harmonised R&D Policies for International R&D Alliances involving Asymmetric Firms

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  • Rod Falvey
  • Khemarat Talerngsri Teerasuwannajak

Abstract

We examine research and development (R&D) policies when a national firm forms an R&D alliance with a foreign competitor. Firms differ in their R&D capabilities, and adopt a profit-sharing rule when R&D decisions are coordinated. National R&D tax/subsidy policies are set independently or harmonised. When firms coodinate their R&D decisions and governments choose R&D policies independently, R&D taxes are chosen. But there is no intervention if policies are harmonised. These policy outcomes affect the types of R&D alliance choosen. Agreements to share R&D information may be preferred to those combining coordination of R&D decisions and information sharing because of the R&D tax that coordination attracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Rod Falvey & Khemarat Talerngsri Teerasuwannajak, "undated". "Competitive and Harmonised R&D Policies for International R&D Alliances involving Asymmetric Firms," Discussion Papers 12/03, University of Nottingham, GEP.
  • Handle: RePEc:not:notgep:12/03
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Vivekananda Mukherjee & Shyama Ramani, 2011. "R&D cooperation in emerging industries, asymmetric innovative capabilities and rationale for technology parks," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 373-394, September.
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