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International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Policy Cooperation in R&D Subsidies and Taxes

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  • Pei-Cheng Liao

Abstract

We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & Brander (1983) in the presence of R&D spillovers. When R&D activities are strategic substitutes and the R&D game exhibits a positive externality, the result of Spencer & Brander (1983) reverses: the non-cooperative policy is a tax while the jointly optimal policy is a subsidy. Moreover, when R&D activities are strategic complements, the usual result of the prisoners' dilemma in the strategic subsidy game does not hold, implying that a welfare intervention is preferable over laissez-faire. When spillovers are sufficiently large, the joint welfare increases with subsidies being higher than those under non-cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Pei-Cheng Liao, 2007. "International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Policy Cooperation in R&D Subsidies and Taxes," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(3), pages 399-417.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:21:y:2007:i:3:p:399-417
    DOI: 10.1080/10168730701520545
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    Cited by:

    1. Rod Falvey & Khemarat Talerngsri Teerasuwannajak, 2016. "Competitive and Harmonized R&D Policies for International R&D Alliances involving Asymmetric Firms," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 302-329, May.
    2. Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2014. "Strategic Product R&D Investment Policy under International Rivalry in the Presence of Demand Spillover Effects," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(2), pages 293-309, June.
    3. Richard Gretz & Jannett Highfill & Robert Scott, 2012. "R&D subsidy games: a cost sharing approach vs. reward for performance," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 385-403, August.
    4. Anita Michalsen, 2012. "R&D policy in a vertically related industry," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(8), pages 737-751, November.
    5. Zeineb Dinar, 2014. "Transboundary Pollution, R&D Spillovers, Absorptive Capacity and International Trade," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 4(3), pages 501-513.
    6. Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella & Luca Gori, 2023. "R&D subsidies in a duopoly market with outsourcing to the rival firm," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(1), pages 100-110, January.

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