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The Consequences of Using One Assessment System To Pursue Two Objectives


  • Derek Neal


Education officials often use one assessment system both to create measures of student achievement and to create performance metrics for educators. However, modern standardized testing systems are not designed to produce performance metrics for teachers or principals. They are designed to produce reliable measures of individual student achievement in a low-stakes testing environment. The design features that promote reliable measurement provide opportunities for teachers to profitably coach students on test taking skills, and educators typically exploit these opportunities whenever modern assessments are used in high-stakes settings as vehicles for gathering information about their performance. Because these coaching responses often contaminate measures of both student achievement and educator performance, it is likely possible to acquire more accurate measures of both student achievement and education performance by developing separate assessment systems that are designed specifically for each measurement task.

Suggested Citation

  • Derek Neal, 2013. "The Consequences of Using One Assessment System To Pursue Two Objectives," NBER Working Papers 19214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19214
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cilliers, Jacobus & Kasirye, Ibrahim & Leaver, Clare & Serneels, Pieter & Zeitlin, Andrew, 2016. "Pay for Locally Monitored Performance? A Welfare Analysis for Teacher Attendance in Ugandan Primary Schools," IZA Discussion Papers 10118, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Thomas S. Dee & Will Dobbie & Brian A. Jacob & Jonah Rockoff, 2016. "The Causes and Consequences of Test Score Manipulation: Evidence from the New York Regents Examinations," NBER Working Papers 22165, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Joshua D. Angrist & Erich Battistin & Daniela Vuri, 2014. "In a Small Moment: Class Size and Moral Hazard in the Mezzogiorno," FBK-IRVAPP Working Papers 2014-04, Research Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies (IRVAPP), Bruno Kessler Foundation.
    4. Erich Battistin, 2016. "How manipulating test scores affects school accountability and student achievement," IZA World of Labor, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), pages 295-295, September.
    5. Melanie Lührmann & Marta Serra-Garcia & Joachim Winter, 2014. "The Impact of Financial Education on Adolescents' Intertemporal Choices," CESifo Working Paper Series 4925, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Singh, Abhijeet, 2015. "Private school effects in urban and rural India: Panel estimates at primary and secondary school ages," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 16-32.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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