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Heterogenous Teacher Effects of Two Incentive Schemes : Evidence from a Low-Income Country

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  • Barrera-Osorio,Felipe
  • Cilliers,Jacobus
  • Cloutier,Marie-Helene
  • Filmer,Deon P.

Abstract

This paper reports on a randomized evaluation of two teacher incentive programs, which were conducted in a nationally representative sample of 420 public primary schools in Guinea. In 140 schools, high-performing teachers were rewarded in-kind, with the value of goods increasing with level of performance. In another 140 schools, high-performing teachers received a certificate and public recognition from the government. After one year, the in-kind program improved learning by 0.24 standard deviations, while the recognition treatment had a smaller and statistically insignificant impact. After two years, the effect from the in-kind program was smaller (0.16 standard deviations) and not significant; the paper provides suggestive evidence that the reduction may be due to the onset of an Ebola outbreak. The effects of the recognition program remained small and insignificant. The effects differed by teacher gender: for female teachers, both programs were equally effective, while for male teachers, only the in-kind program led to statistically significant effects.

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  • Barrera-Osorio,Felipe & Cilliers,Jacobus & Cloutier,Marie-Helene & Filmer,Deon P., 2021. "Heterogenous Teacher Effects of Two Incentive Schemes : Evidence from a Low-Income Country," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9652, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:9652
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. De Walque,Damien B. C. M. & Mavridis,Dimitris, 2022. "Cash Transfers after Ebola in Guinea : Lessons Learned on Human Capital," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9989, The World Bank.
    2. De La O, Ana L. & González, Lucas I. & Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca, 2023. "Voluntary audits: Experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Effective Schools and Teachers; Educational Institutions&Facilities; Communicable Diseases; Gender and Development; Educational Sciences; Public Health Promotion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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