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The Provision of Information and Incentives in School Assignment Mechanisms

In: New Directions in Market Design

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  • Derek Neal
  • Joseph Root

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  • Derek Neal & Joseph Root, 2024. "The Provision of Information and Incentives in School Assignment Mechanisms," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:14939
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt & John List & Sally Sadoff, 2022. "Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Framing: A Field Experiment," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 269-299, November.
    2. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Jonathan Schellenberg & Christopher R. Walters, 2020. "Do Parents Value School Effectiveness?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(5), pages 1502-1539, May.
    3. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2011. "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 399-410, February.
    4. Diether W Beuermann & C Kirabo Jackson & Laia Navarro-Sola & Francisco Pardo, 2023. "What is a Good School, and Can Parents Tell? Evidence on the Multidimensionality of School Output," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(1), pages 65-101.
    5. Prashant Loyalka & Sean Sylvia & Chengfang Liu & James Chu & Yaojiang Shi, 2019. "Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(3), pages 621-662.
    6. Derek Neal & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2010. "Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(2), pages 263-283, May.
    7. Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2012. "Pay for Percentile," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 1805-1831, August.
    8. Adam J. Kapor & Christopher A. Neilson & Seth D. Zimmerman, 2020. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(5), pages 1274-1315, May.
    9. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Christopher R. Walters, 2018. "Free to Choose: Can School Choice Reduce Student Achievement?," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 175-206, January.
    10. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Nikhil Agarwal & Parag A. Pathak, 2017. "The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(12), pages 3635-3689, December.
    11. Chang, Fang & Wang, Huan & Qu, Yaqiong & Zheng, Qiang & Loyalka, Prashant & Sylvia, Sean & Shi, Yaojiang & Dill, Sarah-Eve & Rozelle, Scott, 2020. "The impact of pay-for-percentile incentive on low-achieving students in rural China," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    12. Caterina Calsamiglia & Chao Fu & Maia Güell, 2020. "Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: The Boston Mechanism versus Its Alternatives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 642-680.
    13. Derek Neal, 2013. "The Consequences of Using One Assessment System To Pursue Two Objectives," NBER Working Papers 19214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Ergin, Haluk & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 215-237, January.
    15. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sonmez, 2008. "Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1636-1652, September.
    16. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    17. Nikhil Agarwal & Paulo Somaini, 2020. "Revealed Preference Analysis of School Choice Models," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 12(1), pages 471-501, August.
    18. Will Dobbie & Roland G. Fryer Jr., 2015. "The Medium-Term Impacts of High-Achieving Charter Schools," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(5), pages 985-1037.
    19. Justine S. Hastings & Jeffrey M. Weinstein, 2008. "Information, School Choice, and Academic Achievement: Evidence from Two Experiments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(4), pages 1373-1414.
    20. Kehinde F. Ajayi & Willa H. Friedman & Adrienne M. Lucas, 2020. "When Information is Not Enough: Evidence from a Centralized School Choice System," NBER Working Papers 27887, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Neal, Derek, 2011. "The Design of Performance Pay in Education," Handbook of the Economics of Education, in: Erik Hanushek & Stephen Machin & Ludger Woessmann (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Education, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 495-550, Elsevier.
    22. Isaac Mbiti & Mauricio Romero & Youdi Schipper, 2023. "Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(653), pages 1968-2000.
    23. Derek Neal, 2013. "The Consequences of Using one Assessment System to Pursue two Objectives," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(4), pages 339-352, October.
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