Individual and workplace-specific determinants of paid and unpaid overtime work in Germany
"In Germany, overtime work is a well-established instrument for varying working hours of employees and is of great importance for establishments as a measure of internal flexibility. However, not all employees are affected to the same degree by a variation of the work effort through overtime work. Besides socio-demographic factors, workplace-specific factors that provide information about the position of employees in the establishment play an important role, too. So far, we do not know enough how these workplace-specific factors are associated with overtime work. This question is at the centre of this study. In the analysis, women and part-time employees are taken into account, while previous studies mostly focused on fulltime employees and/or male workers. On the basis of the data of the German Socio- Economic Panel (SOEP), the results show a significant negative correlation between women and paid overtime and between part-time employees and unpaid overtime. If the employees performance is regularly assessed by a superior, paid overtime is less likely, while unpaid overtime becomes more likely. In executive positions, there is a significant positive correlation with paid and unpaid overtime work. Unpaid overtime is more likely with a growing autonomy in the employees' workplace, whereas paid overtime becomes less likely. However, the length of the training period on the job as well as job related burdens due to a job at risk and a limited employment contract seem to have no association with paid or unpaid overtime." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
|Date of creation:||21 Apr 2015|
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