IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fednsr/102433.html

Bank Failures: The Roles of Solvency and Liquidity

Author

Abstract

Bank failures can stem from runs on otherwise solvent banks or from losses that render banks insolvent, regardless of withdrawals. Disentangling the relative importance of liquidity and solvency in explaining bank failures is central to understanding financial crises and designing effective financial stability policies. This paper reviews evidence on the causes of bank failures. Bank failures—both with and without runs—are almost always related to poor fundamentals. Low recovery rates in failure suggest that most failed banks that experienced runs were likely fundamentally insolvent. Examiners’ postmortem assessments also emphasize the primacy of poor asset quality and solvency problems. Before deposit insurance, runs commonly triggered the failure of insolvent banks. However, runs rarely caused the failure of strong banks, as such runs were typically resolved through other mechanisms, including interbank cooperation, equity injections, public signals of strength, or suspension of convertibility. We discuss the policy implications of these findings and outline directions for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergio A. Correia & Stephan Luck & Emil Verner, 2026. "Bank Failures: The Roles of Solvency and Liquidity," Staff Reports 1181, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:102433
    DOI: 10.59576/sr.1181
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr1181.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr1181.html
    File Function: Summary
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.59576/sr.1181?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:102433. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Gabriella Bucciarelli (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbnyus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.