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How does corporate governance affect bank capitalization strategies?

Author

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  • Anginer, Deniz
  • Demirguc-Kunt, Asli
  • Huizinga, Harry
  • Ma, Kebin

Abstract

This paper examines how corporate governance and executive compensation affect bank capitalization strategies for an international sample of banks over the 2003-2011 period. ‘Good’ corporate governance, which favors shareholder interests, is found to give rise to lower bank capitalization. Boards of intermediate size, separation of the CEO and chairman roles, and an absence of anti-takeover provisions, in particular, lead to low bank capitalization. However, executive options and stock wealth invested in the bank is associated with better capitalization except just before the crisis in 2006. In that year stock options wealth was associated with lower capitalization which suggests that potential gains from taking on more bank risk outweighed the prospect of additional loss. Banks’ tendency to continue payouts to shareholders after experiencing negative income shocks are shown to reflect executive risk-taking incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Anginer, Deniz & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry & Ma, Kebin, 2013. "How does corporate governance affect bank capitalization strategies?," CEPR Discussion Papers 9674, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9674
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Calomiris, Charles W. & Carlson, Mark, 2016. "Corporate governance and risk management at unprotected banks: National banks in the 1890s," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 512-532.
    2. repec:eee:jaecon:v:63:y:2017:i:2:p:307-328 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:eee:finsta:v:30:y:2017:i:c:p:139-155 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Sarmiento, Miguel & Galán, Jorge E., 2017. "The influence of risk-taking on bank efficiency: Evidence from Colombia," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 52-73.
    5. Frey, Rainer, 2015. "Multinational banks' deleveraging in the crisis driven by pre-crisis characteristics and behavior," Discussion Papers 18/2015, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    6. Anginer, Deniz & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry & Ma, Kebin, 2014. "Corporate governance and bank insolvency risk : international evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7017, The World Bank.
    7. Stulz, Rene M., 2016. "Risk management, governance, culture, and risk taking in banks," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Aug, pages 43-60.
    8. Roman, Raluca, 2015. "Shareholder activism in banking," Research Working Paper RWP 15-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    9. Beccalli, Elena & Frantz, Pascal, 2016. "Why are some banks recapitalized and others taken over?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 79-95.
    10. Bessler, Wolfgang & Kurmann, Philipp & Nohel, Tom, 2015. "Time-varying systematic and idiosyncratic risk exposures of US bank holding companies," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 45-68.
    11. Adhikari, Binay Kumar & Agrawal, Anup, 2016. "Does local religiosity matter for bank risk-taking?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 272-293.
    12. Croci, Ettore & Hertig, Gerard & Nowak, Eric, 2016. "Decision-making during the credit crisis: Did the Treasury let commercial banks fail?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(PA), pages 476-497.
    13. Renata Karkowska, 2015. "The role of investment banking in systemic risk profiles. Evidence from a panel of EU banking sectors," Faculty of Management Working Paper Series 22015, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management.
    14. Tanaka, Katsuyuki & Kinkyo, Takuji & Hamori, Shigeyuki, 2016. "Random forests-based early warning system for bank failures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 118-121.
    15. Meles, Antonio & Porzio, Claudio & Sampagnaro, Gabriele & Verdoliva, Vincenzo, 2016. "The impact of the intellectual capital efficiency on commercial banks performance: Evidence from the US," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 64-74.
    16. Triki, Thouraya & Kouki, Imen & Dhaou, Mouna Ben & Calice, Pietro, 2017. "Bank regulation and efficiency: What works for Africa?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(PA), pages 183-205.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank capital; Corporate governance; Dividend payouts; Executive compensation;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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