IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/empeco/v62y2022i4d10.1007_s00181-021-02086-4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The impact of CEO compensation and excess reserves on bank risk-taking: the moderating role of monetary policy

Author

Listed:
  • Agyenim Boateng

    (De Montfort University Leicester)

  • Vu Hong Thai Nguyen

    (RMIT Vietnam University, RMIT Saigon South)

  • Min Du

    (De Montfort University Leicester)

  • Frank O. Kwabi

    (De Montfort University Leicester)

Abstract

We examine the effects of CEO compensation, excess reserves, and role of monetary policy on bank risk-taking behaviour based on a sample of 88 Chinese commercial banks over the period of 2003–2014. We find evidence that suggests that incentives present in CEO compensation contracts and excess reserves exert a positive and significant impact on risk-taking and credit risk. However, we find that the positive effects of CEO compensation and excess reserves on risk-taking are cancelled out by the interaction of CEO compensation and excess reserves. Further analysis suggests that the central bank’s monetary policy serves to restrain the effects of an interaction between CEO compensation and excess reserves on bank risk-taking and credit risk. This study extends the theoretical model, which indicates that excess reserves are a major source of credit risk, and notes that the effects of incentives inherent in CEO compensation contracts and excess reserves on bank risk policies are contingent on the monetary policy pursued by the central bank in China’s emerging economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Agyenim Boateng & Vu Hong Thai Nguyen & Min Du & Frank O. Kwabi, 2022. "The impact of CEO compensation and excess reserves on bank risk-taking: the moderating role of monetary policy," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 62(4), pages 1575-1598, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:empeco:v:62:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s00181-021-02086-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s00181-021-02086-4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00181-021-02086-4
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00181-021-02086-4?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "Varieties of Crises and Their Dates," Introductory Chapters, in: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press.
    2. Houston, Joel F. & James, Christopher, 1995. "CEO compensation and bank risk Is compensation in banking structured to promote risk taking?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 405-431, November.
    3. Yermack, David, 1997. "Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 449-476, June.
    4. Arellano, Manuel & Bover, Olympia, 1995. "Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 29-51, July.
    5. Lee Pinkowitz & René Stulz & Rohan Williamson, 2006. "Does the Contribution of Corporate Cash Holdings and Dividends to Firm Value Depend on Governance? A Cross‐country Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2725-2751, December.
    6. Acharya, Viral & Naqvi, Hassan, 2012. "The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquidity and risk taking over the business cycle," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 349-366.
    7. Andres, Pablo de & Vallelado, Eleuterio, 2008. "Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(12), pages 2570-2580, December.
    8. Vincent Bouvatier, 2010. "Hot money inflows and monetary stability in China: how the People's Bank of China took up the challenge," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(12), pages 1533-1548.
    9. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2013. "Are banks too big to fail or too big to save? International evidence from equity prices and CDS spreads," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 875-894.
    10. Jennifer N. Carpenter, 2000. "Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(5), pages 2311-2331, October.
    11. Brambor, Thomas & Clark, William Roberts & Golder, Matt, 2006. "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 63-82, January.
    12. Harris, Richard D. F. & Tzavalis, Elias, 1999. "Inference for unit roots in dynamic panels where the time dimension is fixed," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 201-226, August.
    13. Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger & Stulz, René M., 2011. "Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 11-26, January.
    14. Reinhart, Karmen & Rogoff, Kenneth, 2009. ""This time is different": panorama of eight centuries of financial crises," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 77-114, March.
    15. Agénor, Pierre-Richard & Aynaoui, Karim El, 2010. "Excess liquidity, bank pricing rules, and monetary policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 923-933, May.
    16. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "Is the 2007 US Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different?: An International Historical Comparison," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 56(3), pages 291-299.
    17. Firth, Michael & Fung, Peter M.Y. & Rui, Oliver M., 2006. "Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 693-714, September.
    18. Chava, Sudheer & Purnanandam, Amiyatosh, 2010. "CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 263-278, August.
    19. Chen, Carl R. & Steiner, Thomas L. & Whyte, Ann Marie, 2006. "Does stock option-based executive compensation induce risk-taking? An analysis of the banking industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 915-945, March.
    20. Hodrick, Robert J & Prescott, Edward C, 1997. "Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(1), pages 1-16, February.
    21. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    22. Nguyen, Vu Hong Thai & Boateng, Agyenim, 2013. "The impact of excess reserves beyond precautionary levels on Bank Lending Channels in China," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 358-377.
    23. Neslihan Ozkan, 2011. "CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: an Empirical Investigation of UK Panel Data," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 17(2), pages 260-285, March.
    24. DeYoung, Robert & Peng, Emma Y. & Yan, Meng, 2013. "Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(1), pages 165-196, February.
    25. Blundell, Richard & Bond, Stephen, 1998. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 115-143, August.
    26. Bakke, Tor-Erik & Mahmudi, Hamed & Fernando, Chitru S. & Salas, Jesus M., 2016. "The causal effect of option pay on corporate risk management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 623-643.
    27. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2014. "This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(2), pages 215-268, November.
    28. Pathan, Shams, 2009. "Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(7), pages 1340-1350, July.
    29. Opler, Tim & Pinkowitz, Lee & Stulz, Rene & Williamson, Rohan, 1999. "The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 3-46, April.
    30. Liu, Yixin & Mauer, David C., 2011. "Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 183-198, October.
    31. O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), 1999. "Handbook of Labor Economics," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    32. Agenor, Pierre-Richard & Aizenman, Joshua & Hoffmaister, Alexander W., 2004. "The credit crunch in East Asia: what can bank excess liquid assets tell us?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 27-49, February.
    33. May, Don O, 1995. "Do Managerial Motives Influence Firm Risk Reduction Strategies?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1291-1308, September.
    34. Shinozaki, Shinya & Moriyasu, Hiroshi & Uchida, Konari, 2016. "Shareholder Composition and Managerial Compensation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(5), pages 1719-1738, October.
    35. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    36. Gormley, Todd A. & Matsa, David A. & Milbourn, Todd, 2013. "CEO compensation and corporate risk: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 79-101.
    37. Lewellen, Katharina, 2006. "Financing decisions when managers are risk averse," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 551-589, December.
    38. Allen N. Berger & Leora F. Klapper & Rima Turk-Ariss, 2017. "Bank competition and financial stability," Chapters, in: Jacob A. Bikker & Laura Spierdijk (ed.), Handbook of Competition in Banking and Finance, chapter 10, pages 185-204, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    39. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    40. Jehovaness Aikaeli, 2011. "Determinants of Excess Liquidity in Tanzanian," The African Finance Journal, Africagrowth Institute, vol. 13(1), pages 47-63.
    41. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    42. Morten O. Ravn & Harald Uhlig, 2002. "On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the frequency of observations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 371-375.
    43. Geczy, Christopher & Minton, Bernadette A & Schrand, Catherine, 1997. "Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1323-1354, September.
    44. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    45. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001. "Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(3), pages 901-932.
    46. Hagendorff, Jens & Vallascas, Francesco, 2011. "CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1078-1095, September.
    47. Kevin J. Murphy, 2013. "Regulating Banking Bonuses in the European Union: a Case Study in Unintended Consequences," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 19(4), pages 631-657, September.
    48. Hayes, Rachel M. & Lemmon, Michael & Qiu, Mingming, 2012. "Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 174-190.
    49. Demsetz, Rebecca S & Strahan, Philip E, 1997. "Diversification, Size, and Risk at Bank Holding Companies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 300-313, August.
    50. Andrew Ellul & Vijay Yerramilli, 2013. "Stronger Risk Controls, Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(5), pages 1757-1803, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Qiubin Huang, 2023. "Executive compensation and bank risk in China," Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 62-67.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bharati, Rakesh & Jia, Jingyi, 2018. "Do bank CEOs really increase risk in vega? Evidence from a dynamic panel GMM specification," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 39-53.
    2. Jing Zhang & Jieun Chung, 2018. "Does geographical location matter for managerial compensation design?," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 42(1), pages 1-32, January.
    3. Timothy King & Jonathan Williams, 2013. "Bank Efficiency and Executive Compensation," Working Papers 13009, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
    4. Nguyen, Vu Hong Thai & Boateng, Agyenim, 2015. "An analysis of involuntary excess reserves, monetary policy and risk-taking behaviour of Chinese Banks," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 63-72.
    5. Sardar Ahmad & Saeed Akbar & Devendra Kodwani & Anwar Halari & Syed Zubair Shah, 2023. "Compliance or non‐compliance during financial crisis: Does it matter?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(3), pages 2348-2366, July.
    6. José María Díez-Esteban & Jorge Bento Farinha & Conrado Diego García-Gómez & Cesario Mateus, 2022. "Does board composition and ownership structure affect banks’ systemic risk? European evidence," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(2), pages 155-172, June.
    7. Thai V. H. Nguyen & Agyenim Boateng & Tra Thi Thu Pham, 2019. "Involuntary excess reserve and heterogeneous transmission of policy rates to bank lending rates in China," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 1023-1044, September.
    8. Jia Lu & Agyenim Boateng, 2018. "Board composition, monitoring and credit risk: evidence from the UK banking industry," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 51(4), pages 1107-1128, November.
    9. Jamshed Iqbal & Sami Vähämaa, 2019. "Managerial risk-taking incentives and the systemic risk of financial institutions," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 1229-1258, November.
    10. Armstrong, Christopher & Nicoletti, Allison & Zhou, Frank S., 2022. "Executive stock options and systemic risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 256-276.
    11. Abascal, Ramón & González, Francisco, 2023. "What drives risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation? Some international evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    12. Maurizio Rocca & Raffaele Staglianò & Tiziana Rocca & Alfio Cariola & Ekaterina Skatova, 2019. "Cash holdings and SME performance in Europe: the role of firm-specific and macroeconomic moderators," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 1051-1078, December.
    13. Rui-Xiang Zhai & Po-Hsin Ho & Chih-Yung Lin & Tran Thi Thuy Linh, 2023. "Bank CEO risk-taking incentives and bank lending quality," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 949-981, April.
    14. Pour, Eilnaz Kashefi & Uddin, Moshfique & Murinde, Victor & Amini, Shima, 2023. "CEO power, bank risk-taking and national culture: International evidence," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    15. Dunbar, Craig & Li, Zhichuan (Frank) & Shi, Yaqi, 2020. "CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    16. Chesney, Marc & Stromberg, Jacob & Wagner, Alexander F. & Wolff, Vincent, 2020. "Managerial incentives to take asset risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    17. Nguyen, Vu Hong Thai & Boateng, Agyenim, 2013. "The impact of excess reserves beyond precautionary levels on Bank Lending Channels in China," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 358-377.
    18. Mavrakana, Christina & Psillaki, Maria, 2019. "Do board structure and compensation matter for bank stability and bank performance? Evidence from European banks," MPRA Paper 95776, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Florackis, Chris & Sainani, Sushil, 2018. "How do chief financial officers influence corporate cash policies?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 168-191.
    20. Bruce K. Billings & James R. Moon & Richard M. Morton & Dana M. Wallace, 2020. "Can Employee Stock Options Contribute to Less Risk‐Taking?†," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(3), pages 1658-1686, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:empeco:v:62:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s00181-021-02086-4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.