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The Impact of Financial Sanctions: The Case of Iran 2011-2016

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Abstract

This study provides a detailed analysis of the impact of financial sanctions on publicly traded companies. We consider the effect of imposing and lifting sanctions on the target country's traded equities and examine the differences in the reaction of politically connected firms and those without such connections. The paper focuses on Iran due to (1) its sizable financial markets, (2) imposition of sanctions of varying severity and duration on private and state-owned companies, (3) the significant presence of politically connected firms in the stock market, and (4) the unique event of the 2015 nuclear deal, resulting in fairly rapid lifting of a sizable portion of imposed sanctions. We find that sanctions affect politically connected firms more than ordinary firms, have lasting negative effects on profitability ratios, and that politically connected firms stock prices bounce back more slowly after removal of sanctions. Firms targeted by financial sanctions decrease their leverage and increase their cash holding to manage their perceived increase in risk profile.

Suggested Citation

  • Saeed Ghasseminejad & Mohammad R. Jahan-Parvar, 2020. "The Impact of Financial Sanctions: The Case of Iran 2011-2016," International Finance Discussion Papers 1281, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgif:1281
    DOI: 10.17016/IFDP.2020.1281
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    National security; Financial sanctions; Political connections; Event study; Capital structure; Iran;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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