IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/aim/wpaimx/1414.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Impact of Political Majorities on Firm Value: Do Electoral Promises or Friendship Connections Matter?

Author

Listed:
  • Renaud Coulomb

    (Paris School of Economics, and London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Grantham Research Institute)

  • Marc Sangnier

    (Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS)

Abstract

This paper simultaneously estimates the impact of political majorities on the values of firms that would benefit from the platforms of the two main candidates at the 2007 French presidential election, Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy, and of those that are ruled or owned by Sarkozy’s friends. We use prediction-market data to track each candidate’s victory probability, and investigate how this relates to firms’ abnormal returns. Our estimates suggest that the value of firms that would likely benefit from the platforms of Royal and Sarkozy changed by 1% and 2%, respectively, with the candidates’ victory probabilities, and that firms connected to Sarkozy out-performed others by 3% due to his election.

Suggested Citation

  • Renaud Coulomb & Marc Sangnier, 2014. "The Impact of Political Majorities on Firm Value: Do Electoral Promises or Friendship Connections Matter?," AMSE Working Papers 1414, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised May 2014.
    • Handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1414
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/sites/default/files/_dt/2012/wp_2014_-_nr_14.pdf#overlay-context=fr/recherche/documents-de-travail/impact-political-majorities-firm-value-do-electoral-promises-or
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas Ferguson & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2008. "Betting on Hitler—The Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 101-137.
    2. Manski, Charles F., 2006. "Interpreting the predictions of prediction markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 425-429, June.
    3. Yan-Leung Cheung & P. Raghavendra Rau & Aris Stouraitis, 2010. "Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Central vs. Local Government Shareholders in Chinese Listed Firms," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 14(4), pages 669-694.
    4. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Kermani, Amir & Kwak, James & Mitton, Todd, 2016. "The value of connections in turbulent times: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 368-391.
    5. Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2006. "Prediction Markets in Theory and Practice," NBER Working Papers 12083, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
    7. Wolfers, Justin & Zitzewitz, Eric, 2006. "Interpreting Prediction Market Prices as Probabilities," IZA Discussion Papers 2092, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Luechinger, Simon & Moser, Christoph, 2014. "The value of the revolving door: Political appointees and the stock market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 93-107.
    9. Coulomb, Renaud & Sangnier, Marc, 2014. "The impact of political majorities on firm value: Do electoral promises or friendship connections matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 158-170.
    10. Erik Snowberg & Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2007. "Partisan Impacts on the Economy: Evidence from Prediction Markets and Close Elections," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(2), pages 807-829.
    11. Bernhard,William & Leblang,David, 2006. "Democratic Processes and Financial Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521861229.
    12. Fama, Eugene F, 1970. "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 383-417, May.
    13. Knight*, Brian, 2007. "Are policy platforms capitalized into equity prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 389-409, February.
    14. Federico Cingano & Paolo Pinotti, 2013. "Politicians At Work: The Private Returns And Social Costs Of Political Connections," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 433-465, April.
    15. Quoc-Anh Do & Bang Dang Nguyen & Yen-Teik Lee & Kieu-Trang Nguyen, 2011. "Out of Sight, Out of Mind:The Value of Political Connections in Social Networks," Working Papers 19-2011, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    16. Eitan Goldman & Jörg Rocholl & Jongil So, 2009. "Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(6), pages 2331-2360, June.
    17. Claessens, Stijn & Feijen, Erik & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 554-580, June.
    18. Snowberg, Erik & Wolfers, Justin & Zitzewitz, Eric, 2007. "Party Influence in Congress and the Economy," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 277-286, August.
    19. Michael J. Cooper & Huseyin Gulen & Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov, 2010. "Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(2), pages 687-724, April.
    20. Berg, Joyce & Forsythe, Robert & Nelson, Forrest & Rietz, Thomas, 2008. "Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Markets Research," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in: Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 80, pages 742-751, Elsevier.
    21. Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2004. "Prediction Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 107-126, Spring.
    22. Michael C. Herron & James Lavin & Donald Cram & Jay Silver, 1999. "Measurement of Political Effects in the United States Economy: A Study of the 1992 Presidential Election," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 51-81, March.
    23. Lauren Cohen & Andrea Frazzini & Christopher Malloy, 2008. "The Small World of Investing: Board Connections and Mutual Fund Returns," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(5), pages 951-979, October.
    24. Andrea Mattozzi, 2008. "Can we insure against political uncertainty? Evidence from the U.S. stock market," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 43-55, October.
    25. A. Craig MacKinlay, 1997. "Event Studies in Economics and Finance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 13-39, March.
    26. Fan, Joseph P.H. & Wong, T.J. & Zhang, Tianyu, 2007. "Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 330-357, May.
    27. Li, Hongbin & Meng, Lingsheng & Wang, Qian & Zhou, Li-An, 2008. "Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 283-299, October.
    28. Quoc-Anh Do & Yen-Teik Lee & Bang Dang Nguyen, 2013. "Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03460972, HAL.
    29. Imai, Masami & Shelton, Cameron A., 2011. "Elections and political risk: New evidence from the 2008 Taiwanese Presidential Election," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 837-849.
    30. Christian Slamka & Arina Soukhoroukova & Martin Spann, 2008. "Event Studies in Real- and Play-Money Prediction Markets," Journal of Prediction Markets, University of Buckingham Press, vol. 2(2), pages 53-70, September.
    31. Bernhard,William & Leblang,David, 2006. "Democratic Processes and Financial Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521678384.
    32. Kou, S. G. & Sobel, Michael E., 2004. "Forecasting the Vote: A Theoretical Comparison of Election Markets and Public Opinion Polls," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(3), pages 277-295, July.
    33. Johnson, Simon & Mitton, Todd, 2003. "Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-382, February.
    34. Berg, Joyce E. & Nelson, Forrest D. & Rietz, Thomas A., 2008. "Prediction market accuracy in the long run," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 285-300.
    35. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, December.
    36. Erik Snowberg & Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2011. "How Prediction Markets can Save Event Studies," CAMA Working Papers 2011-07, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    37. David S. Lee & Enrico Moretti, 2009. "Bayesian Learning and the Pricing of New Information: Evidence from Prediction Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 330-336, May.
    38. Jayachandran, Seema, 2006. "The Jeffords Effect," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(2), pages 397-425, October.
    39. Coulomb, Renaud & Sangnier, Marc, 2014. "The impact of political majorities on firm value: Do electoral promises or friendship connections matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 158-170.
    40. Fisman David & Fisman Raymond J. & Galef Julia & Khurana Rakesh & Wang Yongxiang, 2012. "Estimating the Value of Connections to Vice-President Cheney," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-20, December.
    41. MARA FACCIO & RONALD W. MASULIS & JOHN J. McCONNELL, 2006. "Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2597-2635, December.
    42. Simon Luechinger & Christoph Moser, 2012. "The Value of the Revolving Door," KOF Working papers 12-310, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    43. Gökçe Göktepe & Shanker Satyanath, 2013. "The economic value of military connections in Turkey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 531-552, June.
    44. Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, 2005. "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(4), pages 1371-1411.
    45. Stefan Luckner & Christof Weinhardt, 2007. "How to Pay Traders in Information Markets: Results from a Field Experiment," Journal of Prediction Markets, University of Buckingham Press, vol. 1(2), pages 147-156, July.
    46. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
    47. Faccio, Mara & Parsley, David C., 2009. "Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Geographic Ties," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 683-718, June.
    48. Thomas S. Gruca & Joyce E. Berg & Michael Cipriano, 2008. "Incentive and Accuracy Issues in Movie Prediction Markets," Journal of Prediction Markets, University of Buckingham Press, vol. 2(1), pages 29-43, May.
    49. Steven Gjerstad, 2004. "Risk Aversion, Beliefs, and Prediction Market Equilibrium," Microeconomics 0411002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    50. Vaughan Williams,Leighton (ed.), 2005. "Information Efficiency in Financial and Betting Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521816038.
    51. Stefan Luckner & Christof Weinhardt, 2007. "How to pay traders in information markets? Results from a field experiment," Artefactual Field Experiments 00107, The Field Experiments Website.
    52. Paul W. Rhode & Koleman S. Strumpf, 2004. "Historical Presidential Betting Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 127-141, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Luechinger, Simon & Moser, Christoph, 2014. "The value of the revolving door: Political appointees and the stock market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 93-107.
    2. Guilhem Cassan & Marc Sangnier, 2022. "The impact of 2020 French municipal elections on the spread of COVID-19," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 35(3), pages 963-988, July.
    3. Guilhem Cassan & Marc Sangnier, 2020. "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité... Contaminé? Estimating the impact of French municipal elections on COVID-19 spread in France," Working Papers halshs-02877917, HAL.
    4. Kostakis, Alexandros & Mu, Liangyi & Otsubo, Yoichi, 2023. "Detecting political event risk in the option market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    5. Draca, Mirko & Garred, Jason & Stickland, Leanne & Warrinnier, Nele, 2018. "On Target? The Incidence of Sanctions Across Listed Firms in Iran," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 372, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    6. Thomas Bourveau & Renaud Coulomb & Marc Sangnier, 2021. "Political Connections and White-Collar Crime: Evidence from Insider Trading in France," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(5), pages 2543-2576.
    7. Audinga Baltrunaite, 2020. "Political Contributions and Public Procurement: Evidence from Lithuania," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 541-582.
    8. Stefano DellaVigna & Ruben Durante & Brian Knight & Eliana La Ferrara, 2016. "Market-Based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 224-256, January.
    9. Coulomb, Renaud & Sangnier, Marc, 2014. "The impact of political majorities on firm value: Do electoral promises or friendship connections matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 158-170.
    10. Alhashel, Bader S., 2020. "Hail to the chief: The effect of political alignment with the presidency on corporate investment," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    11. Gustav Axén & Dominic Cortis, 2020. "Hedging on Betting Markets," Risks, MDPI, vol. 8(3), pages 1-14, August.
    12. Agustin Casas & Yarine Fawaz & Andre Trindade, 2016. "Surprise Me If You Can: The Influence Of Newspaper Endorsements In U.S. Presidential Elections," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1484-1498, July.
    13. Brice Fabre & Marc Sangnier, 2017. "What Motivates French Pork: Political Career Concerns or Private Connections?," Institut des Politiques Publiques halshs-01480532, HAL.
    14. Coulomb, Renaud & Sangnier, Marc, 2014. "The impact of political majorities on firm value: Do electoral promises or friendship connections matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 158-170.
    15. Straub, Stéphane, 2014. "Political Firms, Public Procurement, and the Democratization Process," TSE Working Papers 14-461, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    16. Fenske, James & Wang, Shizhuo, 2020. "Tradition and mortality: Evidence from twin infanticide in Africa," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 525, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    17. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/ismjpe8i38qaqpf7c0hldeicl is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Labonne, Julien, 2016. "Local political business cycles: Evidence from Philippine municipalities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 56-62.
    19. Lehrer, Nimrod David, 2018. "The value of political connections in a multiparty parliamentary democracy: Evidence from the 2015 elections in Israel," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 13-58.
    20. Mirko Draca & Jason Garred & Leanne Stickland & Nele Warrinnier, 2023. "On Target? Sanctions and the Economic Interests of Elite Policymakers in Iran," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(649), pages 159-200.
    21. Brice Fabre & Marc Sangnier, 2022. "Where do politicians send pork? Evidence from central government transfers to French municipalities," DeFiPP Working Papers 2202, University of Namur, Development Finance and Public Policies.
    22. Martinez-Carrasco, José & ConceiçaÞo, Otavio & Dezolt, Ana Lúcia, 2023. "More Information, Lower Price? Access Market-based Reference Prices and Gains in Public Procurement Efficiency," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 12754, Inter-American Development Bank.
    23. Stéphane Benveniste & Renaud Coulomb & Marc Sangnier, 2022. "The (Market) Value of State Honors," AMSE Working Papers 2201, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    24. Renaud Coulomb & Marc Sangnier, 2014. "The Impact of Political Majorities on Firm Value: Do Electoral Promises or Friendship Connections Matter?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00990241, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Renaud Coulomb & Marc Sangnier, 2014. "The Impact of Political Majorities on Firm Value: Do Electoral Promises or Friendship Connections Matter?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00990241, HAL.
    2. Quoc-Anh Do & Yen-Teik Lee & Bang Dang Nguyen, 2013. "Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections," Working Papers hal-03460972, HAL.
    3. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/65rged1j6o9gl9jvp8a09o3eue is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Lehrer, Nimrod David, 2018. "The value of political connections in a multiparty parliamentary democracy: Evidence from the 2015 elections in Israel," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 13-58.
    5. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09n0dcia0po is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Luechinger, Simon & Moser, Christoph, 2014. "The value of the revolving door: Political appointees and the stock market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 93-107.
    7. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09n0dcia0po is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09n0dcia0po is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Quoc-Anh Do & Yen-Teik Lee & Bang Dang Nguyen, 2013. "Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections," Working Papers hal-03460972, HAL.
    10. Thomas Bourveau & Renaud Coulomb & Marc Sangnier, 2016. "Political Connections and Insider Trading," AMSE Working Papers 1635, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    11. Barraza, Santiago & Rossi, Martín A & Ruzzier, Christian A, 2022. "Sleeping with the enemy: The perils of having the government on(the)board," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 641-651.
    12. David Schoenherr, 2019. "Political Connections and Allocative Distortions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 543-586, April.
    13. Wang, Fangjun & Xu, Luying & Zhang, Junrui & Shu, Wei, 2018. "Political connections, internal control and firm value: Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 53-67.
    14. Wong, Wai-Yan & Hooy, Chee-Wooi, 2018. "Do types of political connection affect firm performance differently?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 297-317.
    15. Miroslav Palanský, 2021. "The value of political connections in the post-transition period: evidence from Czechia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(1), pages 121-154, July.
    16. Quoc-Anh Do & Bang Dang Nguyen & Yen-Teik Lee & Kieu-Trang Nguyen, 2011. "Out of Sight, Out of Mind:The Value of Political Connections in Social Networks," Working Papers 19-2011, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    17. Brown, Jeffrey R. & Huang, Jiekun, 2020. "All the president's friends: Political access and firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(2), pages 415-431.
    18. Child, Travers Barclay & Massoud, Nadia & Schabus, Mario & Zhou, Yifan, 2021. "Surprise election for Trump connections," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 676-697.
    19. Chen, Shuo & Yan, Xun & Yang, Bo, 2020. "Move to success? Headquarters relocation, political favoritism, and corporate performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    20. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/60q2e1naqt82m8pdj5v6rm6jjt is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Su, Zhong-qin & Fung, Hung-Gay & Huang, Deng-shi & Shen, Chung-Hua, 2014. "Cash dividends, expropriation, and political connections: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 260-272.
    22. Grossman, Richard S. & Imai, Masami, 2016. "Taking the lord's name in vain: The impact of connected directors on 19th century British banks," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 75-93.
    23. Shen, Chung-Hua & Bui, Dien Giau & Lin, Chih-Yung, 2017. "Do political factors affect stock returns during presidential elections?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 180-198.
    24. Ozlem Akin & Nicholas S. Coleman & Christian Fons‐Rosen & José‐Luis Peydró, 2021. "Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(3), pages 619-644, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political majority; prediction markets; ?rm value; abnormal returns; political connections.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C58 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Financial Econometrics
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1414. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Gregory Cornu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/amseafr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.