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Party Influence in Congress and the Economy

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  • Erik Snowberg
  • Justin Wolfers
  • Eric Zitzewitz

Abstract

To understand the extent to which partisan majorities in Congress influence economic policy, we compare financial market responses in recent midterm elections to Presidential elections. We use prediction markets tracking election outcomes as a means of precisely timing and calibrating the arrival of news, allowing substantially more precise estimates than a traditional event study methodology. We find that equity values, oil prices, and Treasury yields are slightly higher with Republican majorities in Congress, and that a switch in the majority party in a chamber of Congress has an impact that is only 10-30 percent of that of the Presidency. We also find evidence inconsistent with the popular view that divided government is better for equities, finding instead that equity valuations increase monotonically, albeit slightly, with the degree of Republican control.

Suggested Citation

  • Erik Snowberg & Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2006. "Party Influence in Congress and the Economy," NBER Working Papers 12751, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12751
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Krehbiel, Keith, 1993. "Where's the Party?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(2), pages 235-266, April.
    3. Erik Snowberg & Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2007. "Partisan Impacts on the Economy: Evidence from Prediction Markets and Close Elections," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(2), pages 807-829.
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    Cited by:

    1. Quoc-Anh Do & Bang Dang Nguyen & Yen-Teik Lee & Kieu-Trang Nguyen, 2011. "Out of Sight, Out of Mind:The Value of Political Connections in Social Networks," Working Papers 19-2011, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    2. Niklas Potrafke, 2018. "Government ideology and economic policy-making in the United States—a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 145-207, January.
    3. Mattozzi, Andrea & Snowberg, Erik, 2018. "The right type of legislator: A theory of taxation and representation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 54-65.
    4. Raphaël Godefroy, 2010. "The birth of the congressional clinic," Working Papers halshs-00564921, HAL.
    5. Pietro Ortoleva & Erik Snowberg, 2015. "Overconfidence in Political Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 504-535, February.
    6. Erik Snowberg & Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2011. "How Prediction Markets can Save Event Studies," CAMA Working Papers 2011-07, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    7. Coulomb, Renaud & Sangnier, Marc, 2014. "The impact of political majorities on firm value: Do electoral promises or friendship connections matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 158-170.
    8. Dodge Cahan & Niklas Potrafke, 2021. "The Democrat-Republican presidential growth gap and the partisan balance of the state governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 577-601, December.
    9. Imai, Masami & Shelton, Cameron A., 2011. "Elections and political risk: New evidence from the 2008 Taiwanese Presidential Election," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 837-849.
    10. Montone, Maurizio, 2022. "Does the U.S. president affect the stock market?," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    11. Rothschild, David, 2015. "Combining forecasts for elections: Accurate, relevant, and timely," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 952-964.
    12. Carlsson, Magnus & Dahl, Gordon B. & Rooth, Dan-Olof, 2016. "Do Politicians Change Public Attitudes?," IZA Discussion Papers 10349, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Li, Wanli & Su, Yueying & Wang, Kaixiu, 2022. "How does economic policy uncertainty affect cross-border M&A: Evidence from Chinese firms," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    14. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/60q2e1naqt82m8pdj5v6rm6jjt is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Yaser Abolghasemi & Stanko Dimitrov, 2021. "Determining the causality between U.S. presidential prediction markets and global financial markets," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(3), pages 4534-4556, July.
    16. Magnus Carlsson & Gordon B. Dahl & Dan-Olof Rooth, 2018. "Backlash in Attitudes After the Election of Extreme Political Parties," CESifo Working Paper Series 7210, CESifo.
    17. Niklas Potrafke, 2017. "Government Ideology and Economic Policy-Making in the United States," CESifo Working Paper Series 6444, CESifo.
    18. Lehrer, Nimrod David, 2018. "The value of political connections in a multiparty parliamentary democracy: Evidence from the 2015 elections in Israel," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 13-58.
    19. Coulomb, Renaud & Sangnier, Marc, 2014. "The impact of political majorities on firm value: Do electoral promises or friendship connections matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 158-170.
    20. Labonne, Julien, 2016. "Local political business cycles: Evidence from Philippine municipalities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 56-62.
    21. Carlsson, Magnus & Dahl, Gordon B. & Rooth, Dan-Olof, 2021. "Backlash in policy attitudes after the election of an extreme political party," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    22. Stephen Weymouth & J. Lawrence Broz, 2013. "Government Partisanship and Property Rights: Cross-Country Firm-Level Evidence," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 229-256, July.
    23. Masami Imai & Cameron A. Shelton, 2010. "Elections and Political Risk: New Evidence from Political Prediction Markets in Taiwan," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2010-001, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General

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