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Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector

  • De Borger Bruno

    ()

    (University of Antwerp)

  • Stef Proost

    ()

    (K.U.Leuven-Center for Economic Studies - CORE, UCL, Belgium)

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature dealing with horizontal and vertical tax competition in the transport sector, taking into account the role of transport externalities. Our emphasis throughout is on tax competition between governments, not between private suppliers. For the various different settings (horizontal and vertical competition, parallel and serial networks), we discuss the relevance of tax competition and describe the type of results typically obtained. We further point out the relevance of different types of tax competition for transport policy in a European setting. Finally, we discuss the losses of non-cooperative behaviour of governments.

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Paper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment in its series Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series with number ete0412.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ete:etewps:ete0412
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Web page: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/ew/academic/energmil
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  1. DE BORGER, Bruno & PROOST, Stef, . "Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector," Working Papers 2004022, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  2. Bruno De Borger & Stef Proost (ed.), 2001. "Reforming Transport Pricing in the European Union," Books, Edward Elgar, number 1822.
  3. BOADWAY, Robin & MARCHAND, Maurice & VIGNEAULT, Marianne, 1998. "The consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation," CORE Discussion Papers 1998003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Verhoef, Erik Teodoor & Small, Kenneth A., 1999. "Product Differentiation on Roads: Second-Best Congestion Pricing with Heterogeneity under Public and Private Ownership," ERSA conference papers ersa99pa358, European Regional Science Association.
  5. De Borger, B. & Proost, S. & Van Dender, K., 2005. "Congestion and tax competition in a parallel network," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2013-2040, November.
  6. Mintz, J. & Tulkens, H., 1984. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," CORE Discussion Papers 1984027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann, 1998. "Two Games of Interjurisdictional Competition When Local Governments Provide Industrial Public Goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 471-487, October.
  8. Kehoe, Patrick J, 1989. "Policy Cooperation among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 289-96, April.
  9. Andreas Haufler, 1996. "Optimal factor and commodity taxation in a small open economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 523-527, October.
  10. Erik Teodoor Verhoef & Jan Rouwendal, 2003. "Pricing, Capacity Choice and Financing in Transportation Networks," ERSA conference papers ersa03p41, European Regional Science Association.
  11. Michael Keen, 1998. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(3), pages 454-485, September.
  12. Richard J. Arnott & Ronald E. Grieson, 1978. "Optimal Fiscal Policy for State and Local Government," Working Papers 291, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  13. Braid, Ralph M., 1996. "Peak-Load Pricing of a Transportation Route with an Unpriced Substitute," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 179-197, September.
  14. David Levinson, 2001. "Why States Toll: An Empirical Model of Finance Choice," Working Papers 200102, University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group.
  15. De Borger, Bruno & Courcelle, Christophe & Swysen, Didier, 2004. "Optimal pricing of transport externalities in an international environment: some empirical results based on a numerical optimization model," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 163-201, March.
  16. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Scholarly Articles 3450061, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  17. Thomas Bjørner, 1996. "Any need for coordination of policies towards transit traffic with a negative local externality?," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(2), pages 221-245, September.
  18. Janeba, Eckhard, 1998. "Tax competition in imperfectly competitive markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 135-153, February.
  19. Kraus, Marvin, 2003. "A new look at the two-mode problem," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 511-530, November.
  20. Wildasin, David E., 1988. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March.
  21. repec:dgr:uvatin:19990066 is not listed on IDEAS
  22. repec:dgr:uvatin:19970057 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
  24. WILDASIN, David E., . "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," CORE Discussion Papers RP -831, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  25. Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2003. "Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 177-199, 04.
  26. Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July.
  27. Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, 1991. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size," Working Papers 819, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  28. repec:dgr:uvatin:20030027 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. Janeba, Eckhard & Peters, Wolfgang, 1999. "Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains from Nondiscrimination: The Case of Interest Taxation in Europe," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(452), pages 93-101, January.
  30. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
  31. Hoyt, William H., 2001. "Tax Policy Coordination, Vertical Externalities, and Optimal Taxation in a System of Hierarchical Governments," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 491-516, November.
  32. Verhoef, Erik & Nijkamp, Peter & Rietveld, Piet, 1996. "Second-Best Congestion Pricing: The Case of an Untolled Alternative," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 279-302, November.
  33. Black, Dan A & Hoyt, William H, 1989. "Bidding for Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1249-56, December.
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