IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Urban transport pricing reform with two levels of government: A case study of Brussels

  • Proost, Stef
  • Sen, Ahksaya

This paper analyses two challenges in the reform of urban transport pricing. First the construction of an optimal package of urban transport pricing instruments assuming one benevolent welfare maximizer. It is found that parking and tolling are the most important elements of the optimal package and that these policy instruments are sub-additive in their benefits. The second problem is the use of pricing instruments by different government levels: the urban government controls parking fees and the regional government controls a cordon toll. It is found that the overall efficiency losses in the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are limited.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Transport Policy.

Volume (Year): 13 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 127-139

in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:trapol:v:13:y:2006:i:2:p:127-139
Contact details of provider: Web page:

Order Information: Postal:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Edward Calthrop & Stef Proost, 1998. "Road Transport Externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 335-348, April.
  2. Proost, Stef & Van Dender, Kurt, 2001. "The welfare impacts of alternative policies to address atmospheric pollution in urban road transport," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 383-411, July.
  3. Stef Proost & Kurt Van Dender & Christoph Courcelle & John Peirson & Duncan Sharp, 2001. "How large is the gap between present and efficient transport prices in Europe?," Chapters, in: Reforming Transport Pricing in the European Union, chapter 17 Edward Elgar.
  4. Mohring, Herbert, 1972. "Optimization and Scale Economies in Urban Bus Transportation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 591-604, September.
  5. De Borger Bruno & Stef Proost, 2004. "Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0412, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
  6. Bruno De Borger & Stef Proost & Kurt Van Dender, 2003. "Congestion and tax competition in a parallel network," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0309, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
  7. Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July.
  8. Arnott, Richard & Grieson, Ronald E., 1981. "Optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 23-48, January.
  9. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
  10. Bruno De Borger & Stef Proost (ed.), 2001. "Reforming Transport Pricing in the European Union," Books, Edward Elgar, number 1822, March.
  11. Mayeres, Inge & Proost, Stef, 1997. " Optimal Tax and Public Investment Rules for Congestion Type of Externalities," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(2), pages 261-79, June.
  12. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:trapol:v:13:y:2006:i:2:p:127-139. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.