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Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector

  • Bruno de Borger
  • Stef Proost

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature dealing with horizontal and vertical tax competition in the transport sector, taking into account the role of transport externalities. Our emphasis throughout is on tax competition between governments, not between private suppliers. For the various different settings (horizontal and vertical competition, parallel and serial networks), we discuss the relevance of tax competition and describe the type of results typically obtained. We further point out the relevance of different types of tax competition for transport policy in a European setting. Finally, we discuss the losses of non-cooperative behaviour of governments.

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Article provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique.

Volume (Year): XLIII (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 45-64

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Handle: RePEc:cai:rpvedb:rpve_434_0045
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  1. Hoyt, William H., 2001. "Tax Policy Coordination, Vertical Externalities, and Optimal Taxation in a System of Hierarchical Governments," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 491-516, November.
  2. Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 289-296.
  3. Mintz, Jack & Tulkens, Henry, 1986. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 133-172, March.
  4. Richard J. Arnott & Ronald E. Grieson, 1978. "Optimal Fiscal Policy for State and Local Government," Working Papers 291, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  5. Erik Teodoor Verhoef & Jan Rouwendal, 2003. "Pricing, Capacity Choice and Financing in Transportation Networks," ERSA conference papers ersa03p41, European Regional Science Association.
  6. Bruno De Borger & Stef Proost (ed.), 2001. "Reforming Transport Pricing in the European Union," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1822.
  7. DE BORGER, Bruno & PROOST, Stef, . "Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector," Working Papers 2004022, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  8. Verhoef, Erik Teodoor & Small, Kenneth A., 1999. "Product Differentiation on Roads: Second-Best Congestion Pricing with Heterogeneity under Public and Private Ownership," ERSA conference papers ersa99pa358, European Regional Science Association.
  9. Janeba, Eckhard & Peters, Wolfgang, 1999. "Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains from Nondiscrimination: The Case of Interest Taxation in Europe," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(452), pages 93-101, January.
  10. WILDASIN, David E., . "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," CORE Discussion Papers RP 831, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. Michael Keen, 1997. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Working Papers 97/173, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Vigneault, Marianne, 1998. "The consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 453-478, June.
  13. Thomas Bjørner, 1996. "Any need for coordination of policies towards transit traffic with a negative local externality?," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(2), pages 221-245, September.
  14. David Levinson, 2001. "Why States Toll: An Empirical Model of Finance Choice," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 35(2), pages 223-237, May.
  15. Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, 1991. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size," Working Papers 819, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  16. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Scholarly Articles 3450061, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  17. Bruno De Borger & Stef Proost & Kurt Van Dender, 2003. "Congestion and tax competition in a parallel network," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0309, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  18. Janeba, Eckhard, 1998. "Tax competition in imperfectly competitive markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 135-153, February.
  19. Verhoef, Erik & Nijkamp, Peter & Rietveld, Piet, 1996. "Second-Best Congestion Pricing: The Case of an Untolled Alternative," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 279-302, November.
  20. Haufler, Andreas, 1996. "Optimal Factor and Commodity Taxation in a Small Open Economy," Munich Reprints in Economics 20393, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  21. Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July.
  22. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
  23. Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2003. "Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 177-199, 04.
  24. WILDASIN, David, . "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," CORE Discussion Papers RP 804, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  25. Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann, 1998. "Two Games of Interjurisdictional Competition When Local Governments Provide Industrial Public Goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 471-487, October.
  26. Marvin Kraus, 2002. "A New Look at the Two-Mode Problem," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 551, Boston College Department of Economics.
  27. Braid, Ralph M., 1996. "Peak-Load Pricing of a Transportation Route with an Unpriced Substitute," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 179-197, September.
  28. Black, Dan A & Hoyt, William H, 1989. "Bidding for Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1249-56, December.
  29. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
  30. De Borger, Bruno & Courcelle, Christophe & Swysen, Didier, 2004. "Optimal pricing of transport externalities in an international environment: some empirical results based on a numerical optimization model," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 163-201, March.
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