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Chapter 3 Public finance aspects of transport charging and investments

  • Proost, Stef
  • De Borger, Bruno
  • Koskenoja, Pia

In this chapter we address three aspects of the pricing and financing of transport infrastructure. First, we analyse the optimal pricing and investment of transport infrastructure. We take a normative approach and propose cost benefit rules to assess investments together with the way they are funded. Second, we survey the specific problems that arise when local governments have responsibility for transport infrastructure and pricing: tax exporting, spillovers, etc. Third, we take a political economy stance and look at issues like lobbying, earmarking and bureaucratic influences.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Transportation Economics.

Volume (Year): 19 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 59-80

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Handle: RePEc:eee:retrec:v:19:y:2007:i:1:p:59-80
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  2. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," NBER Working Papers 10241, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Guesnerie, Roger, 1977. "On the direction of tax reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 179-202, April.
  4. De Borger, B. & Dunkerley, F. & Proost, S., 2007. "Strategic investment and pricing decisions in a congested transport corridor," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 294-316, September.
  5. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-769, August.
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  8. Mayeres, Inge & Proost, Stef, 1997. " Optimal Tax and Public Investment Rules for Congestion Type of Externalities," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(2), pages 261-279, June.
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  13. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner, 2003. "The Marginal Cost of Public Funds in OECD Countries. Hours of Work Versus Labor Force Participation," CESifo Working Paper Series 935, CESifo Group Munich.
  14. A. B. Atkinson & N. H. Stern, 1974. "Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 119-128.
  15. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716.
  16. CALTHROP, Edward & DE BORGER, Bruno & PROOST, Stef, . "Externalities and partial tax reform: Does it make sense to tax road freight (but not passenger) transport?," Working Papers 2006017, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  17. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 265-286.
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