IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/retrec/v38y2013i1p11-21.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Strategies of state and local government in management of urban transport problems – A case of Delhi

Author

Listed:
  • Sen, Akshaya Kumar
  • Tiwari, Geetam
  • Upadhyay, Vrajaindra

Abstract

In India, different layers of Government control different policy instruments to tackle transport externalities which might result in coordination problems and possible efficiency losses. This paper, therefore, addresses the coordination problem resulting from the division of policy instruments between two different government levels that face different types of externalities in varying degrees of magnitude in the urban transport sector by developing three types of theoretical models: the Full Control Centralised Model where the state government has full control over all pricing instrument; a Nash equilibrium model where each of the government levels controls only one instrument and takes the behaviour of the other as given; and a Stackelberg equilibrium mode where the behaviour of the state government is influenced by the fact that one of the price instruments is controlled by the local government. With an empirical illustration of the model for Delhi, the paper finds that since there are many interactions and many externalities between the two levels of government, a division of roles between them does not guarantee an efficient pricing outcome and the efficiency of pricing would depend on the institutional set up and on the correspondence between the objective functions of the two government levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Sen, Akshaya Kumar & Tiwari, Geetam & Upadhyay, Vrajaindra, 2013. "Strategies of state and local government in management of urban transport problems – A case of Delhi," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 11-21.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:retrec:v:38:y:2013:i:1:p:11-21
    DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2012.05.006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0739885912000510
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. De Borger, B. & Proost, S. & Van Dender, K., 2005. "Congestion and tax competition in a parallel network," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2013-2040, November.
    2. Bruno de Borger & Stef Proost, 2004. "Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector," Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(4), pages 45-64.
    3. Edward Calthrop & Stef Proost, 1998. "Road Transport Externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 335-348, April.
    4. Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July.
    5. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    6. Keller, Wouter J., 1976. "A nested CES-type utility function and its demand and price-index functions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 175-186, February.
    7. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 269-304, June.
    8. Arnott, Richard & Grieson, Ronald E., 1981. "Optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 23-48, January.
    9. Proost, Stef & Sen, Ahksaya, 2006. "Urban transport pricing reform with two levels of government: A case study of Brussels," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 127-139, March.
    10. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Transport pricing; Transport externalities; Multi-government coordination problem; Nash equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:retrec:v:38:y:2013:i:1:p:11-21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/620614/description#description .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.