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Attenuating the forward guidance puzzle: implications for optimal monetary policy

Author

Listed:
  • Nakata, Taisuke
  • Ogaki, Ryota
  • Schmidt, Sebastian
  • Yoo, Paul

Abstract

We examine the implications of less powerful forward guidance for optimal policy using a sticky-price model with an effective lower bound (ELB) on nominal interest rates as well as a discounted Euler equation and Phillips curve. When the private-sector agents discount future economic conditions more in making their decisions today, an announced cut in future interest rates becomes less effective in stimulating current economic activity. While the implication of such discounting for optimal policy depends on its degree, we find that, under a wide range of plausible degrees of discounting, it is optimal for the central bank to compensate for the reduced effect of a future rate cut by keeping the policy rate at the ELB for longer. JEL Classification: E52, E58, E61

Suggested Citation

  • Nakata, Taisuke & Ogaki, Ryota & Schmidt, Sebastian & Yoo, Paul, 2019. "Attenuating the forward guidance puzzle: implications for optimal monetary policy," Working Paper Series 2220, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20192220
    Note: 2179645
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    discounted euler equation; discounted phillips curve; effective lower bound; forward guidance; optimal policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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