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Incentives and Stability Of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment

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  • Bosetti, Valentina
  • Carraro, Carlo
  • De Cian, Enrica
  • Massetti, Emanuele
  • Tavoni, Massimo

Abstract

This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions’ profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the social welfare aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We focus on the profitability, stability, and 'potential stability' of a number of coalitions which are 'potentially effective' in reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even 'potentially stable' even through an adequate set of transfers. However, there exist potentially stable coalitions, but of smaller size, which are also potentially environmentally effective. Depending on the assumptions made, they could achieve up to 600 ppm CO2-eq. More ambitious targets lead to the collapse of the coalition.

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  • Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & De Cian, Enrica & Massetti, Emanuele & Tavoni, Massimo, 2012. "Incentives and Stability Of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment," CEPR Discussion Papers 8821, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8821
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    3. Milan Ščasný & Emanuele Massetti & Jan Melichar & Samuel Carrara, 2015. "Quantifying the Ancillary Benefits of the Representative Concentration Pathways on Air Quality in Europe," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(2), pages 383-415, October.
    4. Thierry Brechet and Henry Tulkens, 2015. "Climate Policies: A Burden, or a Gain?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    5. Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2011. "The Cost Of Climate Change Mitigation Policy In Eastern Europe And Former Soviet Union," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 2(04), pages 341-370.
    6. Jan Kersting & Vicki Duscha & Matthias Weitzel, 2017. "Cooperation on Climate Change under Economic Linkages: How the Inclusion of Macroeconomic Effects Affects Stability of a Global Climate Coalition," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4).
    7. Sareh Vosooghi & Maria Arvaniti & Rick van der Ploeg, 2022. "Self-Enforcing Climate Coalitions for Farsighted Countries: Integrated Analysis of Heterogeneous Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 9768, CESifo.
    8. Valentina Bosetti & Enrica De Cian, 2013. "A Good Opening: The Key to Make the Most of Unilateral Climate Action," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 255-276, October.
    9. Jasper N. Meya & Ulrike Kornek & Kai Lessmann, 2018. "How empirical uncertainties influence the stability of climate coalitions," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 175-198, April.
    10. KORNEK, Urik & LESSMANN, Kai & TULKENS, Henry, 2014. "Transferable and non transferable utility implementations of coalitional stability in integrated assessment models," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    11. Eren Cifci & Matthew E. Oliver, 2018. "Reassessing the Links between GHG Emissions, Economic Growth, and the UNFCCC: A Difference-in-Differences Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-22, January.
    12. Olivier Bos & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer, 2016. "Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 118(4), pages 785-815, October.
    13. Carlo Carraro, 2014. "International environmental cooperation," Chapters, in: Giles Atkinson & Simon Dietz & Eric Neumayer & Matthew Agarwala (ed.), Handbook of Sustainable Development, chapter 26, pages 418-431, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Thomas Hickmann & Christoph Bertram & Frank Biermann & Elina Brutschin & Elmar Kriegler & Jasmine E. Livingston & Silvia Pianta & Keywan Riahi & Bas van Ruijven & Detlef van Vuuren, 2022. "Exploring Global Climate Policy Futures and Their Representation in Integrated Assessment Models," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 10(3), pages 171-185.
    15. Jing Wu & Jean-Claude Thill, 2018. "Climate change coalition formation and equilibrium strategies in mitigation games in the post-Kyoto Era," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 573-598, August.
    16. Holladay J. Scott & Livermore Michael A., 2013. "Regional variation, holdouts, and climate treaty negotiations," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 131-157, August.
    17. Venkatachalam ANBUMOZHI, 2015. "Low Carbon Green Growth in Asia: What is the Scope for Regional Cooperation?," Working Papers DP-2015-29, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA).
    18. Matthew McGinty, 2020. "Leadership and Free-Riding: Decomposing and Explaining the Paradox of Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 77(2), pages 449-474, October.
    19. Christian Gollier and Jean Tirole, 2015. "Negotiating effective institutions against climate change," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Climate coalitions; Climate policy; Free riding; Game theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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