IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/13693.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The transmission channels of unconventional monetary policy: Evidence from a change in collateral requirements in France

Author

Listed:
  • Delatte, Anne-Laure
  • Garg, Pranav
  • Imbs, Jean

Abstract

Using a bank-firm level credit registry combined with firm-level balance sheet data we establish the presence of heterogeneity in the effects of unconventional monetary policy transmission. We examine the consequences of a loosening in the collateral eligibility requirement for credit refinancing in France. The policy was designed to affect bank lending positively. We expect a linear increase in lending and an additional increase in loans to firms with newly acceptable rating. We find a large heterogeneity of the monetary policy transmission including the unexpected reduction of lending by the banks benefiting the most from the policy. These are small, risk-averse banks whose foremost concern after the recession was to strengthen their balance sheets. Banks least affected by the policy respond with a reduction in credit to low risk borrowers in reaction to the change in the market structure. Last we document heterogenous effects of the policy on firms depending on their size.

Suggested Citation

  • Delatte, Anne-Laure & Garg, Pranav & Imbs, Jean, 2019. "The transmission channels of unconventional monetary policy: Evidence from a change in collateral requirements in France," CEPR Discussion Papers 13693, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13693
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13693
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Breckenfelder, Johannes & De Fiore, Fiorella & Andrade, Philippe & Karadi, Peter & Tristani, Oreste, 2016. "The ECB's asset purchase programme: an early assessment," Working Paper Series 1956, European Central Bank.
    2. Jiménez, Gabriel & Ongena, Steven & Peydró, José-Luis & Saurina, Jesús, 2017. "Do Demand or Supply Factors Drive Bank Credit, in Good and Crisis Times?," EconStor Preprints 216802, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    3. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 27-48, Fall.
    4. Christophe Cahn & Mattia Girotti & Federica Salvadè, 2018. "External Credit Ratings and Bank Lending," Working papers 691, Banque de France.
    5. García-Posada, Miguel & Marchetti, Marcos, 2016. "The bank lending channel of unconventional monetary policy: The impact of the VLTROs on credit supply in Spain," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 427-441.
    6. Joshua D. Angrist & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 2009. "Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 8769, October.
    7. Luisa Carpinelli & Matteo Crosignani, 2017. "The Effect of Central Bank Liquidity Injections on Bank Credit Supply," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-038, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. V. Bignon & F. Boissay & C. Cahn & L.-M. Harpedanne de Belleville, 2016. "Extended eligibility of credit claims for Eurosystem refinancing Consequences for the supply of credit to companies," Quarterly selection of articles - Bulletin de la Banque de France, Banque de France, issue 43, pages 15-23, Autumn.
    9. Filippo De Marco, 2017. "Bank Lending and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis," Working Papers 213, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    10. Carla Soares & Diana Bonfim & Nuno Alves, 2016. "Surviving the perfect storm: the role of the lender of last resort," Working Papers w201617, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    11. Foley-Fisher, Nathan & Ramcharan, Rodney & Yu, Edison, 2016. "The impact of unconventional monetary policy on firm financing constraints: Evidence from the maturity extension program," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 409-429.
    12. Cahn, Christophe & Duquerroy, Anne & Mullins, William, 2017. "Unconventional Monetary Policy and Bank Lending Relationships," SocArXiv vgk25, Center for Open Science.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate Finance; individual data; Real Effects Of Monetary Policy; Transmission Channels; Unconventional Monetary Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • C55 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Large Data Sets: Modeling and Analysis
    • C58 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Financial Econometrics
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13693. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.