IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/rfinst/v31y2018i3p943-979..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does a Larger Menu Increase Appetite? Collateral Eligibility and Credit Supply

Author

Listed:
  • Sjoerd Van Bekkum
  • Marc Gabarro
  • Rustom M. Irani

Abstract

We examine a change in the European Central Bank’s collateral framework, which significantly lowered the rating requirement for eligible residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), and its impact on bank lending and risk-taking in the Netherlands. Banks most affected by the policy increase loan supply and lower interest rates on new mortgage originations. These lower-interest-rate loans serve as collateral for newly issued RMBS with lower-rated tranches and subsequently experience worse repayment performance. The performance deterioration is pronounced among loans with state guarantees, which suggests that looser collateral requirements may lead to undesired credit risk transfer to the sovereign. Received June 14, 2016; editorial decision September 8, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Sjoerd Van Bekkum & Marc Gabarro & Rustom M. Irani, 2018. "Does a Larger Menu Increase Appetite? Collateral Eligibility and Credit Supply," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(3), pages 943-979.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:31:y:2018:i:3:p:943-979.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhx112
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Crosignani, Matteo & Faria-e-Castro, Miguel & Fonseca, Luís, 2020. "The (Unintended?) consequences of the largest liquidity injection ever," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 97-112.
    2. Hartmann, Philipp & Smets, Frank, 2018. "The first twenty years of the European Central Bank: monetary policy," Working Paper Series 2219, European Central Bank.
    3. Chundakkadan, Radeef & Sasidharan, Subash, 2020. "Central bank's liquidity provision and firms' financial constraints," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 245-255.
    4. Klein, Philipp & Mössinger, Carina & Pfingsten, Andreas, 2021. "Transparency as a remedy for agency problems in securitization? The case of ECB’s loan-level reporting initiative," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 46(C).
    5. Delatte, Anne-Laure & , & Imbs, Jean, 2019. "The transmission channels of unconventional monetary policy: Evidence from a change in collateral requirements in France," CEPR Discussion Papers 13693, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Matthias Kaldorf & Florian Wicknig, 2021. "Risky Financial Collateral, Firm Heterogeneity, and the Impact of Eligibility Requirements," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 123, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    7. Carpinelli, Luisa & Crosignani, Matteo, 2021. "The design and transmission of central bank liquidity provisions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 27-47.
    8. Francesco Giovanardi & Matthias Kaldorf & Lucas Radke & Florian Wicknig, 2023. "The Preferential Treatment of Green Bonds," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 51, pages 657-676, December.
    9. Jasova, Martina & Mendicino, Caterina & Supera, Dominik, 2021. "Policy uncertainty, lender of last resort and the real economy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 381-398.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:31:y:2018:i:3:p:943-979.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfsssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.