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Fifty Shades of QE: Conflicts of Interest in Economic Research

Author

Listed:
  • Brian Fabo

    (National Bank of Slovakia)

  • Martina Jancokova

    (European Central Bank)

  • Elisabeth Kempf

    (University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; CEPR)

  • Lubos Pastor

    (National Bank of Slovakia; University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; NBER; CEPR)

Abstract

Central banks sometimes evaluate their own policies. To assess the inherent conflict of interest, we compare the research findings of central bank researchers and academic economists regarding the macroeconomic effects of quantitative easing (QE). We find that central bank papers report larger effects of QE on output and inflation. Central bankers are also more likely to report significant effects of QE on output and to use more positive language in the abstract. Central bankers who report larger QE effects on output experience more favorable career outcomes. A survey of central banks reveals substantial involvement of bank management in research production.

Suggested Citation

  • Brian Fabo & Martina Jancokova & Elisabeth Kempf & Lubos Pastor, 2020. "Fifty Shades of QE: Conflicts of Interest in Economic Research," Working Papers 2020-128, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2020-128
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Understanding How Central Banks Use Their Balance Sheets: A Critical Categorization
      by Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz in Money, Banking and Financial Markets on 2021-06-07 11:57:45

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    Cited by:

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    2. Bonciani, Dario & Oh, Joonseok, 2023. "Revisiting the New Keynesian policy paradoxes under QE," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
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    4. Alexandra Ferreira‐Lopes & Pedro Linhares & Luís Filipe Martins & Tiago Neves Sequeira, 2022. "Quantitative easing and economic growth in Japan: A meta‐analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 235-268, February.
    5. Joel Bank & Hamish Fitchett & Adam Gorajek & Benjamin A. Malin & Andrew Staib, 2021. "Star Wars at Central Banks," Staff Report 620, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    6. Di Casola, Paola & Stockhammar, Pär, 2021. "When domestic and foreign QE overlap: evidence from Sweden," Working Paper Series 404, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    7. Francisco Louçã & Alexandre Abreu & Gonçalo Pessa Costa, 2021. "Disarray at the headquarters: Economists and Central bankers tested by the subprime and the COVID recessions [Forward guidance without common knowledge]," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 30(2), pages 273-296.
    8. Stephen Anthony & Hamid Yahyaei, 2022. "Bringing Credibility Back to Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 41(3), pages 276-295, September.
    9. Grahame Johnson & Sharon Kozicki & Romanos Priftis & Lena Suchanek & Jonathan Witmer & Jing Yang, 2020. "Implementation and Effectiveness of Extended Monetary Policy Tools: Lessons from the Literature," Discussion Papers 2020-16, Bank of Canada.
    10. Timothy Anderson & John Hawkins, 2021. "Modelling the Reserve Bank of Australia's Policy Decisions and the Case for a Negative Cash Rate," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 54(2), pages 179-189, June.
    11. Jakub Rybacki & Dobromił Serwa, 2021. "What Makes a Successful Scientist in a Central Bank? Evidence From the RePEc Database," Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, vol. 13(3), pages 331-357, September.
    12. Böhl, Gregor, 2021. "Efficient solution and computation of models with occasionally binding constraints," IMFS Working Paper Series 148, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
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    14. Adam Gorajek & Joel Bank & Andrew Staib & Benjamin Malin & Hamish Fitchett, 2021. "Star Wars at Central Banks," RBA Research Discussion Papers rdp2021-02, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    15. Orame, Andrea & Ramcharan, Rodney & Robatto, Roberto, 2023. "Quantitative easing, accounting and prudential frameworks, and bank lending," ESRB Working Paper Series 144, European Systemic Risk Board.
    16. Doucouliagos, Hristos & Hinz, Thomas & Zigova, Katarina, 2022. "Bias and careers: Evidence from the aid effectiveness literature," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    17. Hielke Van Doorslaer & Mattias Vermeiren, 2021. "Pushing on a String: Monetary Policy, Growth Models and the Persistence of Low Inflation in Advanced Capitalism," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(5), pages 797-816, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conflict of interest; central bank; quantitative easing; qe; career concerns;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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