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Non-Tariff Measures in Agri-Food Trade: What Does the Data Tell Us? Evidence from a Cluster Analysis on OECD Imports

  • Disdier, Anne-Celia
  • van Tongeren, Frank W.

Non-tariff measures (NTMs) are playing an increasing role in international trade of agri-food trade. Although well-recognized, this aspect has not been extensively analysed at a disaggregated product level. This paper presents a quantitative analysis of the trade incidence of NTMs notified by OECD countries on 777 products and clusters these products according to three trade indicators. While the ‘protection for sale’ literature provides useful explanations, it is not completely satisfying in resolving the puzzle of cross-product differences in the occurrence of NTMs.

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51759
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Paper provided by International Association of Agricultural Economists in its series 2009 Conference, August 16-22, 2009, Beijing, China with number 51759.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ags:iaae09:51759
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.iaae-agecon.org/
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  1. Rigoberto A. Lopez & Xenia Matschke, 2006. "Food Protection for Sale," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(3), pages 380-391, 08.
  2. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," CEP Discussion Papers dp0791, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  3. Ronald Fischer & Pablo Serra, 1998. "Standards and Protection," Documentos de Trabajo 45, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  4. Valeria Costantini & Riccardo Crescenzi & Fabrizio De Filippis & Luca Salvatici, 2007. "Bargaining Coalitions in the WTO Agricultural Negotiations," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(5), pages 863-891, 05.
  5. Susumu Imai & Hajime Katayama & Kala Krishna, 2008. "A Quantile-based Test of Protection for Sale Model," NBER Working Papers 13900, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
  7. Diaz-Bonilla, Eugenio & Thomas, Marcelle & Robinson, Sherman & Cattaneo, Andrea, 2000. "Food security and trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization," TMD discussion papers 59, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  8. Disdier, Anne-Celia & Fontagne, Lionel & Mimouni, Mondher, 2008. "AJAE Appendix: The Impact of Regulations on Agricultural Trade: Evidence from the SPS and TBT Agreements," American Journal of Agricultural Economics Appendices, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(2), May.
  9. Bombardini, Matilde, 2008. "Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 329-348, July.
  10. Anne-Célia Disdier & Lionel Fontagné & Mondher Mimouni, 2007. "The Impact of Regulations on Agricultural Trade: Evidence from SPS and TBT Agreements," Working Papers 2007-04, CEPII research center.
  11. Facchini, Giovanni & van Biesebroeck, Johannes & Willmann, Gerald, 2003. "Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing," Economics Working Papers 2004,01, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
  12. repec:inr:wpaper:244269 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Bruno Henry de Frahan & Mark Vancauteren, 2006. "Harmonisation of food regulations and trade in the Single Market: evidence from disaggregated data," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 33(3), pages 337-360, September.
  14. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  15. repec:hal:journl:hal-00287137 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December.
  17. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
  18. Christian Bjørnskov & Kim Martin Lind, 2005. "Underlying Policies in the wto, the Harbinson Proposal and the Modalities Agreement," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 56(6), pages 1385-1412.
  19. Lionel Fontagné & Mondher Mimouni & Jean-Michel Pasteels, 2005. "Estimating the Impact of Environmental SPS and TBT on International Trade," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00270511, HAL.
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