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Non-Tariff Measures in Agri-Food Trade: What Do the Data Tell Us? Evidence from a Cluster Analysis on OECD Imports

  • Anne-Célia Disdier
  • Frank van Tongeren

Non-tariff measures (NTMs) play an increasing role in the international trade of agri-food products. Although well-recognized, this role has not been extensively analyzed at a disaggregated level. This paper focuses on NTMs enacted by member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development for 777 products. Using a cluster-analysis, the paper identifies the correlation between the occurrence of NTMs, their trade coverage, and the incidence of trade frictions for these products. The paper relates the statistical findings to the political economy literature on protection to explain cross-product differences in the occurrence of NTMs and trade frictions. Copyright 2010, Oxford University Press.

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Article provided by Agricultural and Applied Economics Association in its journal Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy.

Volume (Year): 32 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 436-455

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Handle: RePEc:oup:apecpp:v:32:y:2010:i:3:p:436-455
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  1. Susumu Imai & Hajime Katayama & Kala Krishna, 2010. "A Quantile-based Test of Protection for Sale Model," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd10-140, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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  10. Valeria Costantini & Riccardo Crescenzi & Fabrizio De Filippis & Luca Salvatici, 2007. "Bargaining Coalitions in the WTO Agricultural Negotiations," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(5), pages 863-891, 05.
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  12. Diaz-Bonilla, Eugenio & Thomas, Marcelle & Robinson, Sherman & Cattaneo, Andrea, 2000. "Food security and trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization," TMD discussion papers 59, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  13. Disdier, Anne-Celia & Fontagne, Lionel & Mimouni, Mondher, 2008. "AJAE Appendix: The Impact of Regulations on Agricultural Trade: Evidence from the SPS and TBT Agreements," American Journal of Agricultural Economics Appendices, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(2), May.
  14. Bombardini, Matilde, 2008. "Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 329-348, July.
  15. Bruno Henry de Frahan & Mark Vancauteren, 2006. "Harmonisation of food regulations and trade in the Single Market: evidence from disaggregated data," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 33(3), pages 337-360, September.
  16. Ronald Fischer & Pablo Serra, 1998. "Standards and Protection," Documentos de Trabajo 45, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
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