Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C78: Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

2020

• Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2020, "Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 27143, May.
• Mohammad Akbarpour & Julien Combe & Yinghua He & Victor Hiller & Robert Shimer & Olivier Tercieux, 2020, "Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 27765, Sep.
• Renee Bowen & Ilwoo Hwang & Stefan Krasa, 2020, "Personal Power Dynamics in Bargaining," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 27981, Oct.
• Matthew Backus & Thomas Blake & Jett Pettus & Steven Tadelis, 2020, "Communication and Bargaining Breakdown: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 27984, Oct.
• Alessandra Casella & Evan Friedman & Manuel Perez Archila, 2020, "Mediating Conflict in the Lab," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 28137, Nov.
• Inácio Bó & Rustamdjan Hakimov, 2020, "Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 130, issue 626, pages 356-392.
• Braz Camargo & Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri, 2020, "Efficiency in Decentralised Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 130, issue 626, pages 446-461.
• Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas R Palfrey, 2020, "The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 18, issue 4, pages 1969-2012.
• Luca Repetto & Alex Solís, 2020, "The Price of Inattention: Evidence from the Swedish Housing Market," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 18, issue 6, pages 3261-3304.
• Thomas Gall & David Reinstein, 2020, "Losing face," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, volume 72, issue 1, pages 164-190.
• Lars Ehlers & Thayer Morrill, 2020, "(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 87, issue 4, pages 1837-1875.
• Jacob K Goeree & Luke Lindsay, 2020, "The Exposure Problem and Market Design," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 87, issue 5, pages 2230-2255.
• Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2020, "Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: Ha-Essential Equilibria," Working Papers CIE, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics, number 130, Feb.
• Britta Hoyer & Nadja Stroh-Maraun, 2020, "Stability in Weighted College Admissions Problems," Working Papers Dissertations, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, number 63, May.
• Nadja Stroh-Maraun, 2020, "Pareto Efficiency in Weighted School Choice Problems," Working Papers Dissertations, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, number 64, May.
• Simon Hoof, 2020, "A pure bargaining game of dynamic cake eating," Working Papers Dissertations, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, number 67, Apr.
• Lisa Bruttel & Werner Güth & Juri Nithammer & Andreas Orland, 2020, "Inefficient Cooperation under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty," CEPA Discussion Papers, Center for Economic Policy Analysis, number 20, Sep, DOI: 10.25932/publishup-47550.
• Nakao, Keisuke, 2020, "Rationalist Explanations for Two-Front War," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 100426, May.
• Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2020, "Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 104044, Nov.
• Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2020, "Strategic Issues in College Admissions with Early Decision," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 98587, Feb.
• Kang, Kee-Youn & Jang, Inkee, 2020, "Dynamic Adverse Selection and Belief Update in Credit Markets," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 99071, Feb.
• Federico Echenique & Ruy Gonzalez & Alistair J Wilson & Leeat Yariv, 2020, "Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies., number 271, Dec.
• Kim, Jeongbin & Lim, Wooyoung & Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2020, "Bargaining and Time Preferences: An Experimental Study," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 254, Aug.
• Alexey Gorn, 2020, "Code and data files for "The Role of Headhunters in Wage Inequality: It's All about Matching"," Computer Codes, Review of Economic Dynamics, number 18-477, revised .
• Reza Raie & Akbar Komijani & Mortaza Baky Haskuee & Hamidreza Jafari, 2020, "Simulating interbank money market interest rate using search models within a Nash-Equilibrium framework," Quarterly Journal of Applied Theories of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Management and Business, University of Tabriz, volume 7, issue 3, pages 25-50.
• Chelsea Pardini & Ana Espinola-Arredondo, 2020, "Game-Theoretic Analyses of US Settlement Allowing for Coercion," Working Papers, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University, number 2020-3, Oct.
• Devjani Chatterjee & Akhil Pratap Singh, 2020, "Zone of Possible Agreement in Negotiation: Impact of Gender and Personality," Proceedings of International Academic Conferences, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences, number 10012557, Feb.
• Antonios Avgeris & Panagiota Sergaki & Achilleas Kontogeorgos & Antonios Tiganis, 2020, "Reciprocity in Student Groups: Experimental Evidence from Greece," International Journal of Economic Sciences, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences, volume 9, issue 1, pages 44-67, June.
• D. Glycopantis, 2020, "Two-person Bargaining with Lexicographic Preferences," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 1, pages 13-23, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00170-8.
• Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2020, "Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 1, pages 125-137, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00172-6.
• Conan Mukherjee, 2020, "On group strategyproof and optimal object allocation," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 8, issue 2, pages 289-304, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-020-00184-7.
• Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara, 2020, "Nonconvex Bargaining Problems: Some Recent Developments," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, volume 37, issue 1, pages 7-41, November, DOI: 10.1007/s41412-020-00098-6.
• Youngsub Chun, 2020, "Some Impossibility Results on the Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, volume 37, issue 1, pages 59-65, November, DOI: 10.1007/s41412-020-00099-5.
• William Thomson, 2020, "Reconciling Consistency and Continuity: A Bounded-Population Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, volume 37, issue 1, pages 43-57, November, DOI: 10.1007/s41412-020-00103-y.
• Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2020, "Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, volume 37, issue 1, pages 1-6, November, DOI: 10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.
• Francesca Flamini, 2020, "Divide and Invest: Bargaining in a Dynamic Framework," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, volume 37, issue 1, pages 121-153, November, DOI: 10.1007/s41412-020-00105-w.
• Morimitsu Kurino, 2020, "Credibility, efficiency, and stability: a theory of dynamic matching markets," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 71, issue 1, pages 135-165, January, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-019-00004-z.
• Huanxing Yang, 2020, "Targeted search, endogenous market segmentation, and wage inequality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 69, issue 2, pages 367-414, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-018-01172-6.
• King King Li & Kang Rong, 2020, "The gambling effect of final-offer arbitration in bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 69, issue 2, pages 475-496, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-018-1169-x.
• Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor, 2020, "Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 70, issue 3, pages 665-684, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01223-6.
• Andrés Salamanca, 2020, "A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 49, issue 1, pages 195-225, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00686-0.
• Yukihiko Funaki & Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova, 2020, "Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 49, issue 2, pages 525-546, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00695-z.
• Armando Gomes & Wilfredo Maldonado, 2020, "Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional offers," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 49, issue 3, pages 773-800, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00720-6.
• Tong Wang & Congyi Zhou, 2020, "High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 24, issue 3, pages 215-269, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00237-0.
• Elif Özcan-Tok, 2020, "Bargaining on supply chain networks with heterogeneous valuations," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, volume 28, issue 2, pages 506-525, July, DOI: 10.1007/s11750-020-00540-7.
• Tatyana Deryugina & Frances C. Moore & Richard S.J. Tol, 2020, "Applications of the Coase Theorem," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School, number 0820, Apr.
• Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky, 2020, "Assortative Information Disclosure," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2020-08, Jun.
• Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky, 2020, "The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2020-12, Sep.
• Rene van den Brink & Saish Nevrekar, 2020, "Peaceful Agreements to Share a River," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 20-016/II, Apr.
• Rachel Cassidy & Marije Groot Bruinderink & Wendy Janssens & Karlijn Morsink, 2020, "The Power to Protect: Household Bargaining and Female Condom Use," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 20-058/VI, Sep.
• Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez & Antonio Romero Medina, 2020, "School Choice with Transferable Students Characteristics," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico, number 2020-04, Jul.
• Thomas Demuynck & Tom Potoms, 2020, "Weakening Transferable Utility: the Case of Non-intersecting Pareto Curves," ULB Institutional Repository, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2013/303534, Apr.
• Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2020, "Expectational Equilibria in Many-to-one Matching Models with Contracts - A Reformulation of Competitive Equilibrium," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), number 018, Jul, DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2020018.
• Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, V., 2020, "Do Stable Outcomes Survive in Marriage Problems with Myopic and Farsighted Players?," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), number 031, Nov, DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2020031.
• Nicolas C. Bedard & Jacob K. Goeree & Philippos Louis & Jingjing Zhang, 2020, "The Favored but Flawed Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction," Working Paper Series, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 2020/03, Feb.
• Gilbert L. Skillman, 2020, "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Market Analysis," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics, number 2020-005, Apr.
• Haluk Ergin & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2020, "Efficient and Incentive‐Compatible Liver Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 88, issue 3, pages 965-1005, May, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA16400.
• Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon & Sonia Jaffe & Scott Duke Kominers, 2020, "Taxation In Matching Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 61, issue 4, pages 1591-1634, November, DOI: 10.1111/iere.12474.
• Jin Yeub Kim, 2020, "Efficient and Neutral Mechanisms in Almost Ex Ante Bargaining Problems," Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute, number 2020rwp-174, Jun.
• Jin Yeub Kim, 2020, "A Noncooperative Foundation of the Neutral Bargaining Solution," Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute, number 2020rwp-175, Jun.
• Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2020, "A Universal Dynamic Auction for Unimodular Demand Types: An Efficient Auction Design for Various Kinds of Indivisible Commodities," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 20/08, Jul.
• Daske, Thomas, 2020, "Efficient Incentives in Social Networks: Gamification and the Coase Theorem," EconStor Preprints, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 213805.
• Daske, Thomas, 2020, "Efficient Incentives in Social Networks: Gamification and the Coase Theorem," EconStor Preprints, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 222527, revised 2020.
• Cigno, Alessandro, 2020, "A strictly economic explanation of gender roles: The lasting legacy of the plough," GLO Discussion Paper Series, Global Labor Organization (GLO), number 660.
• Lee, Suil, 2020, "Measuring the Effects of the Uniform Settlement Rate Requirement in the International Telephone Industry," KDI Journal of Economic Policy, Korea Development Institute (KDI), volume 42, issue 1, pages 57-96, DOI: 10.23895/kdijep.2020.42.1.57.
• Kumar, Rajnish & Manocha, Kriti & Ortega, Josué, 2020, "On the Integration of Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets," QBS Working Paper Series, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School, number 2020/03, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3593239.
• Aue, Robert & Klein, Thilo & Ortega, Josué, 2020, "What Happens when Separate and Unequal School Districts Merge?," QBS Working Paper Series, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School, number 2020/06, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3636103.
• Alem, Yonas & Hassen, Sied & Köhlin, Gunnar, 2020, "Decision-making within the household: The role of autonomy and differences in preferences," Ruhr Economic Papers, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen, number 874, DOI: 10.4419/96973012.
• Dilger, Alexander, 2020, "Abfindungen für Vorstandsmitglieder ohne und mit Beschränkungen
  [Severance payments to members of executive boards without and with limits]," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics, number 11/2020.
• Aue, Robert & Klein, Thilo & Ortega, Josué, 2020, "What happens when separate and unequal school districts merge?," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 20-032.
• Deepal Basak & Joyee Deb, 2020, "Gambling over Public Opinion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 11, pages 3492-3521, November, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181495.
• Brendan Daley & Brett Green, 2020, "Bargaining and News," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 2, pages 428-474, February, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181316.
• Joel Watson & David A. Miller & Trond E. Olsen, 2020, "Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 7, pages 2153-2197, July, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180427.
• Qingmin Liu, 2020, "Stability and Bayesian Consistency in Two-Sided Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 8, pages 2625-2666, August, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181186.
• Fuhito Kojima & Ning Sun & Ning Neil Yu, 2020, "Job Matching under Constraints," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 9, pages 2935-2947, September, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190780.
• Doron Ravid, 2020, "Ultimatum Bargaining with Rational Inattention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 110, issue 9, pages 2948-2963, September, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170620.
• Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger & Ali Yurukoglu, 2020, "Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 3, pages 72-105, July, DOI: 10.1257/app.20170574.
• John William Hatfield & Ravi Jagadeesan & Scott Duke Kominers, 2020, "Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts: Corrigendum," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 12, issue 3, pages 277-285, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190204.
• Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux, 2020, "Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, volume 2, issue 4, pages 425-442, December, DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20190307.
• Yuliyan Mitkov, 2020, "A Theory of Debt Maturity and Innovation," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 050, Dec.
• Noelia Juárez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2020, "Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 18, Aug.
• Agustín G. Bonifacio & Elena Inarra & Pablo Neme, 2020, "Non-convergence to stability in coalition formation games," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 23, Sep.
• Somouaoga Bonkoungou & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020, "Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2001.06166, Jan, revised Jan 2020.
• Bhavook Bhardwaj & Rajnish Kumar & Josue Ortega, 2020, "Fairness and Efficiency in Cake-Cutting with Single-Peaked Preferences," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2002.03174, Feb, revised Mar 2020.
• Federico Echenique & Ruy Gonzalez & Alistair Wilson & Leeat Yariv, 2020, "Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2002.05323, Feb, revised Dec 2020.
• Noelia Juarez & Pablo A. Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2020, "Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching market," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2002.08156, Feb, revised Jun 2020.
• Haris Aziz & Barton E. Lee, 2020, "A characterization of proportionally representative committees," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2002.09598, Feb, revised Jul 2021.
• S. Nageeb Ali & Ayal Chen-Zion & Erik Lillethun, 2020, "Reselling Information," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2004.01788, Apr, revised Dec 2022.
• Tatyana Deryugina & Frances Moore & Richard S. J. Tol, 2020, "Applications of the Coase Theorem," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2004.04247, Apr, revised Jan 2021.
• Rajnish Kunar & Kriti Manocha & Josue Ortega, 2020, "On the integration of Shapley-Scarf housing markets," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2004.09075, Apr, revised Jan 2022.
• Michelle Avataneo & Bertan Turhan, 2020, "Slot-specific Priorities with Capacity Transfers," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2004.13265, Apr, revised Sep 2020.
• Orhan Aygun & Bertan Turhan, 2020, "Dynamic Reserves in Matching Markets," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2005.01103, May.
• Thilo Klein & Robert Aue & Josue Ortega, 2020, "School choice with independent versus consolidated districts," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2006.13209, Jun, revised Jul 2024.
• Agustin G. Bonifacio & Elena Inarra & Pablo Neme, 2020, "A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2009.11689, Sep, revised May 2024.
• Mustafa Ou{g}uz Afacan & In'acio B'o & Bertan Turhan, 2020, "Assignment Maximization," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2012.01011, Dec.
• Azar Abizada & In'acio B'o, 2020, "Hiring from a pool of workers," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2012.09541, Dec.
• Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag Pathak, 2020, "Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2101.01093, Dec.
• Robert J., Schmidt & Christiane, Schwieren & Martin, Vollmann, 2020, "The Value of Verbal Feedback in Allocation Decisions," Working Papers, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, number 0677, Feb.
• Salgado Alfredo, 2020, "Many-to-one Matching: Externalities and Stability," Working Papers, Banco de México, number 2020-03, Mar.
• Dejan Trifunović, 2020, "Uparivanje Lekara I Bolnica Primenom Gejl-Šejplijevog Algoritma (Matching Doctors And Hospitals With The Gale-Shapely Algorithm)," Ekonomske ideje i praksa, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, issue 37, pages 37-51, June.
• Mohammad Akbarpour & Julien Combe & Yinghua He & Victor Hiller & Robert Shimer & Olivier Tercieux, 2020, "Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money," Working Papers, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics, number 2020-126.
• Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2020, "Agency Theory Meets Matching Theory," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1140, Jan.
• Federico Echenique & Antonio Miralles & Jun Zhang, 2020, "Constrained Pseudo-Market Equilibrium," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1149, Jan.
• Suting Hong & Konstantinos Serfes & Veikko Thiele, 2020, "Competition in the venture capital market and the success of startup companies: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 29, issue 4, pages 741-791, October, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12394.
• Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2020, "Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics, number 1007, May.
• Kyle Greenberg & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020, "Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army’s Branching Process Through Market Design," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics, number 1035, Jun.
• Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2020, "A Common-Value Auction With State-Dependent Participation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2018_063v2, Dec.
• Nakao Keisuke, 2020, "Rationalist Explanations for Two-Front War," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, volume 26, issue 4, pages 1-20, December, DOI: 10.1515/peps-2020-0018.
• Crettez Bertrand, 2020, "The Coase Theorem, the Nonempty Core, and the Legal Neutrality Principle," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, volume 16, issue 1, pages 1-16, March, DOI: 10.1515/rle-2018-0027.
• Crettez Bertrand, 2020, "The Coase Theorem, the Nonempty Core, and the Legal Neutrality Principle," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, volume 16, issue 1, pages 1-16, March, DOI: 10.1515/rle-2018-0027.
• Geoffroy de Clippel & Jack Fanning & Kareen Rozen, 2020, "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts Under Incomplete Information," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics, number 2020-13.
• Roberto Serrano, 2020, "Sixty-Seven Years of the Nash Program: Time for Retirement?," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics, number 2020-20.
• Marco Rogna, 2020, "The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model," BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series, Faculty of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen, number BEMPS69, Feb.
• Kyung nok Chun & Zachary Schaller & Stergios Skaperdas, 2020, "Why Are There Strikes?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, volume 130, issue 6, pages 929-956.
• Emin Karagözoglu & Kerim Keskin & Cagri Saglam, 2020, "Race Meets Bargaining in Product Development," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8109.
• Claus-Jochen Haake & Thorsten Upmann & Papatya Duman, 2020, "Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8422.
• Alessandro Cigno & Alessandro Gioffré & Annalisa Luporini, 2020, "Evolution of Individual Preferences and Persistence of Family Rules," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8576.
• Kyung nok Chun & Zachary Schaller & Stergios Skaperdas, 2020, "Why Are There Strikes?," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8620.
• Alessandro Cigno, 2020, "A Strictly Economic Explanation of Gender Roles: The Lasting Legacy of the Plough," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8668.
• Jeongbin Kim & Wooyoung Lim & Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2020, "Bargaining and Time Preferences: An Experimental Study," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8683.
• Steven Gjerstad & Andrea Molle, 2020, "Comorbidity Factors Influence COVID-19 Mortality Much More than Age," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 20-30.
• Yan Peng & Jason Shachat & Lijia Wei & S. Sarah Zhang, 2020, "Speed Traps: Algorithmic Trader Performance Under Alternative Market Structures," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 20-39.
• Andrés Gago, 2020, "Confrontation Costs in Negotiations: Bargaining Under the Veil of a Screen," Working Papers, CEMFI, number wp2020_2022, Oct.
• Steven Riascos Carabalí & Mar�a del Pilar Castillo Valencia, 2020, "El ajuste de cuentas como un mecanismo para corregir contratos criminales," Revista Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Militar Nueva Granada, volume 28, issue 1, pages 67-88, DOI: 10.18359/rfce.4263.
• Herings, Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2020, "Do Stable Outcomes Survive in Marriage Problems with Myopic and Farsighted Players?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2020033, Nov.
• Herings, Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2020, "Matching with myopic and farsighted players," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 3139, Dec, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020..
• Gerardi, Dino & Maestri, Lucas & Monzon, Ignacio, 2020, "Bargaining over a divisible good in the market for lemons," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14920, Jun.
• He, YingHua & Magnac, Thierry, 2020, "Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15082, Jul.
• Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2020, "Task Allocation and On-the-job Training," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15356, Oct.
• Pycia, Marek & Ãœnver, M. Utku, 2020, "Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15377, Oct.
• Bowen, T. Renee & Krasa, Stefan & Hwang, Ilwoo, 2020, "Agenda-Setter Power Dynamics: Learning in Multi-Issue Bargaining," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15406, Oct.
• Casella, Alessandra & Friedman, Evan & Perez Archila, Manuel, 2020, "Mediating Conflict in the Lab," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15483, Nov.
• Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020, "Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15492, Nov.
• Echenique, Federico & Gonzalez, Ruy & Wilson, Alistair & Yariv, Leeat, 2020, "Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15559, Dec.
• Nickesha Ayoade & Szilvia Pápai, 2020, "School Choice with Preference Rank Classes," Working Papers, Concordia University, Department of Economics, number 20002, Feb.
• John M. Kelsey; Dr Steve Kadivar, 2020, "Stakeholder-driven design and appraisal in hydroelectric projects: a participatory gaming approach," CRANEC - Working Papers del Centro di Ricerche in Analisi economica e sviluppo economico internazionale, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Centro di Ricerche in Analisi economica e sviluppo economico internazionale (CRANEC), number crn2005.
• Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Monica Costa Dias & Costas Meghir, 2020, "Changes in Assortative Matching: Theory and Evidence for the US," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2226, Mar.
• Thomas Demuynck & Umutcan Salman, 2020, "On the Revealed Preference Analysis of Stable Aggregate Matchings," Working Papers ECARES, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2020-42, Sep.
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• Jia, Hao, 2020, "The even split rule for (concave) symmetric supermodular functions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108783.
• Klijn, Flip & Pais, Joana & Vorsatz, Marc, 2020, "Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108853.
• Evdokimov, Kirill S., 2020, "Uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108931.
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• Bhardwaj, Bhavook & Kumar, Rajnish & Ortega, Josué, 2020, "Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109064.
• Yu, Zhixian, 2020, "Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 192, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109247.
• Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2020, "A note on discontinuity and approximate equilibria in games with infinitely many players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 193, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109267.
• Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2020, "Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 196, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109493.
• Isoni, Andrea & Sugden, Robert & Zheng, Jiwei, 2020, "The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428.
• Marcassa, Stefania & Pouyet, Jérôme & Trégouët, Thomas, 2020, "Marriage strategy among the European nobility," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, volume 75, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2019.101303.
• Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram, 2020, "The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 15-29, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.009.
• Zhang, Jun, 2020, "When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 251-266, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.008.
• Yu, Jingsheng & Zhang, Jun, 2020, "A market design approach to job rotation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 180-192, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.002.
• Troyan, Peter & Delacrétaz, David & Kloosterman, Andrew, 2020, "Essentially stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 370-390, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.009.
• Navarro, Noemí & Veszteg, Róbert F., 2020, "On the empirical validity of axioms in unstructured bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 117-145, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.003.
• Bloch, Francis & Cantala, David & Gibaja, Damián, 2020, "Matching through institutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 204-231, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.010.
• Hoyer, B. & Stroh-Maraun, N., 2020, "Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 453-481, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006.
• Liu, Peng, 2020, "Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 565-584, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.006.
• Zhang, Hanzhe, 2020, "Pre-matching gambles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 76-89, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.014.
• Wu, Binzhen & Zhong, Xiaohan, 2020, "Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 1-21, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.007.
• Yang, Yi-You, 2020, "Rationalizable choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 120-126, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.003.
• Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2020, "Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 41-53, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.005.
• Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Newton, Jonathan, 2020, "Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 68-80, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.004.
• Shneyerov, Artyom & Wong, Adam C.L., 2020, "Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 183-206, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.006.
• Hu, Gaoji & Li, Jiangtao & Tang, Rui, 2020, "The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 305-318, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.015.
• Wu, Qingyun, 2020, "Entering classes in the college admissions model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 579-587, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.003.
• Schlegel, Jan Christoph & Mamageishvili, Akaki, 2020, "Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 62-81, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.009.
• Nungsari, Melati & Flanders, Sam, 2020, "Using classroom games to teach core concepts in market design, matching theory, and platform theory," International Review of Economics Education, Elsevier, volume 35, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.iree.2020.100190.
• Ha, Wei & Kang, Le & Song, Yang, 2020, "College matching mechanisms and matching stability: Evidence from a natural experiment in China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 206-226, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.002.
• Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2020, "Why should majority voting be unfair?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 281-295, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.015.
• Li, Mengling, 2020, "Ties matter: Improving efficiency in course allocation by allowing ties," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 354-384, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.07.030.
• Troyan, Peter & Morrill, Thayer, 2020, "Obvious manipulations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 185, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104970.
• Cheremukhin, Anton & Restrepo-Echavarria, Paulina & Tutino, Antonella, 2020, "Targeted search in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 185, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104956.
• Bjerre-Nielsen, Andreas, 2020, "Assortative matching with network spillovers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105028.
• Burguet, Roberto & Caminal, Ramon, 2020, "Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105013.
• Rong, Kang & Tang, Qianfeng & Zhang, Yongchao, 2020, "On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105014.
• Lam, Wing Tung, 2020, "Inefficient sorting under output sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105031.
• Demuynck, Thomas & Potoms, Tom, 2020, "Weakening transferable utility: The case of non-intersecting Pareto curves," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105035.
• Utgoff, Naomi, 2020, "Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105054.
• Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2020, "Dynamic reserves in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105069.
• Ashlagi, Itai & Nikzad, Afshin, 2020, "What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105120.
• Albrecht, James & Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter & Vroman, Susan, 2020, "Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105121.
• Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2020, "Matching with myopic and farsighted players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105125.
• Hoyer, Britta & van Huizen, Thomas & Keijzer, Linda & Rezaei, Sarah & Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Westbrock, Bastian, 2020, "Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field," Labour Economics, Elsevier, volume 64, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815.
• Khanna, Shantanu, 2020, "Salary History Bans and Wage Bargaining: Experimental Evidence," Labour Economics, Elsevier, volume 65, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101853.
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• Ekici, Özgün, 2020, "Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 89, issue C, pages 53-65, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.003.
• Ortega, Josué, 2020, "Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 15-24, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.003.
• Salamanca, Andrés, 2020, "On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 38-49, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.09.002.
• Koetter, Michael, 2020, "Lending effects of the ECB’s asset purchases," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 116, issue C, pages 39-52, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.08.019.
• Zapal, Jan, 2020, "Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101816.
• Agranov, Marina & Cotton, Christopher & Tergiman, Chloe, 2020, "Persistence of power: Repeated multilateral bargaining with endogenous agenda setting authority," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 184, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104126.
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