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Pledge and implement bargaining in the Paris Agreement on climate change

Author

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  • Alejandro Caparrós

Abstract

This paper analyzes a multilateral bargain game motivated by the Paris Agreement on climate change. Countries submit pledges, which can be revoked although this implies reputational costs. Pledges, which do not need to be accepted by other countries, detail intended abatement efforts and can be conditional or unconditional, according to whether they depend on transfers. As the process is repeated, incomplete long-term provisions are also considered. The analysis shows the conditions under which, despite its weakness, the Paris Agreement can bring the world to the first best, or at least closer. It also details how to improve the current agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Alejandro Caparrós, 2020. "Pledge and implement bargaining in the Paris Agreement on climate change," Working Papers 2003, Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC.
    • Handle: RePEc:ipp:wpaper:2003
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    File URL: http://investigacion.cchs.csic.es/RePEc/ipp/wpaper/ipp_wp_3_2020_plegde.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining Theory; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Global Warming;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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