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Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems

Author

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  • John Kennes
  • Daniel Monte
  • Norovsambuu Tumennasan

Abstract

In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. With a commonly used restriction on the schools' priorities, manipulation vanishes as the number of agents increases, but without it the mechanism can be manipulated, even in large economies. We also check manipulation in large finite economies through a novel computer algorithm, which can check every possible manipulation by examining all the different matchings that a single player can induce.

Suggested Citation

  • John Kennes & Daniel Monte & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2019. "Strategic Performance of Deferred Acceptance in Dynamic Matching Problems," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 55-97, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:11:y:2019:i:2:p:55-97
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170077
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kotowski, Maciej, 2019. "A Perfectly Robust Approach to Multiperiod Matching Problems," Working Paper Series rwp19-016, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    2. Haeringer, Guillaume & Iehlé, Vincent, 2021. "Gradual college admission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    3. Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2018. "Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 1-20.
    4. Vincent Iehlé, 2016. "Gradual College Admisssion," Post-Print halshs-02367006, HAL.
    5. Ata Atay & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2023. "Complementarities in childcare allocation under priorities," Papers 2308.14689, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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