IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pwo211.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Stephane Wolton

Personal Details

First Name:Stephane
Middle Name:
Last Name:Wolton
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pwo211
http://stephanewolton.com/

Affiliation

Department of Government
London School of Economics (LSE)

London, United Kingdom
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/government/
RePEc:edi:dvlseuk (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Howell, William & Shepsle, Kenneth & Wolton, Stephane, 2020. "Executive Absolutism: A Model," MPRA Paper 98221, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Dewan, Torun & Wolton, Stephane, 2019. "A Political Economy of Social Discrimination," MPRA Paper 94394, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Wolton, Stephane, 2018. "Signaling in the shadow of conflict," MPRA Paper 83922, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy?," MPRA Paper 84837, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation and Electoral Incentives," MPRA Paper 82753, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Montagnes, B. Pablo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Rule versus discretion: regulatory uncertainty, firm investment, and bureaucratic organization," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67075, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  7. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Rational ignorance, populism, and reform," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86371, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  8. Wolton, Stephane, 2016. "Lobbying, Inside and Out: How Special Interest Groups Influence Policy Choices," MPRA Paper 68637, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Montagnes, B. Pablo & Wolton, Stephane, 2015. "Rule Versus Discretion: Regulatory Uncertainty, Firm Investment, and the Ally Principle," MPRA Paper 65047, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2014. "Electoral Imbalances and their Consequences," MPRA Paper 68650, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Nov 2015.
  11. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2014. "The Voters' Curses: The Upsides and Downsides of Political Engagement," MPRA Paper 53482, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2013. "Rational Ignorance, Elections, and Reform," MPRA Paper 68638, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2015.

Articles

  1. Stephane Wolton, 2019. "Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(3), pages 548-562, July.
  2. Montagnes, B. Pablo & Wolton, Stephane, 2019. "Mass Purges: Top-Down Accountability in Autocracy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(4), pages 1045-1059, November.
  3. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2019. "Campaign Cost and Electoral Accountability," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1-21, January.
  4. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2018. "Rational ignorance, populism, and reform," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 119-135.
  5. Howell, William G. & Wolton, Stephane, 2018. "The Politician’s Province," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 13(2), pages 119-146, May.
  6. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Citizens United: A Theoretical Evaluation," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(3), pages 567-574, July.
  7. Navin Kartik & Richard Van Weelden & Stephane Wolton, 2017. "Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(4), pages 958-970, October.
  8. Carlo Prato & Stephane Wolton, 2016. "The Voters' Curses: Why We Need Goldilocks Voters," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 60(3), pages 726-737, July.
  9. Stephane Wolton, 2015. "Political conflicts, the role of opposition parties, and the limits on taxation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 570-587, October.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Dewan, Torun & Wolton, Stephane, 2019. "A Political Economy of Social Discrimination," MPRA Paper 94394, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Quoc-Anh Do & Roberto Galbiati & Benjamin Marx & Miguel A. Ortiz-Serrano, 2023. "J’Accuse! Antisemitism and Financial Markets in the Time of the Dreyfus Affair," CESifo Working Paper Series 10748, CESifo.
    2. Martinangeli, Andrea F.M. & Windsteiger, Lisa, 2023. "Immigration vs. poverty: Causal impact on demand for redistribution in a survey experiment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    3. Felix S.F. Schaff, 2023. "The Unequal Spirit of the Protestant Reformation: Particularism and Wealth Distribution in Early Modern Germany," Working Papers 0239, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).

  2. Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy?," MPRA Paper 84837, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Gene M Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2020. "Electoral Competition with Fake News," Working Papers 269, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    2. Blumenthal, Benjamin, 2022. "Voter Information and Distributive Politics," SocArXiv r7w4m, Center for Open Science.
    3. Izzo, Federica & Dewan, Torun & Wolton, Stephane, 2022. "Cumulative knowledge in the social sciences: The case of improving voters' information," MPRA Paper 112559, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Anqi Li & Lin Hu, 2020. "Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized Information Aggregation," Papers 2009.03761, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    5. Li, Anqi & Hu, Lin, 2023. "Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 296-315.
    6. Devdariani, Saba & Hirsch, Alexander V., 2023. "Voter attention and electoral accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).

  3. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation and Electoral Incentives," MPRA Paper 82753, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & Ravindran, Dilip & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 665, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    2. Tomoya Tajika, 2021. "Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 67-100, January.

  4. Montagnes, B. Pablo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Rule versus discretion: regulatory uncertainty, firm investment, and bureaucratic organization," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67075, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    Cited by:

    1. Breig, Zachary & Downey, Mitch, 2021. "Agency breadth and political influence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 253-268.
    2. Canes-Wrone, Brandice & Ponce de Leon, Christian & Thieme, Sebastian, 2022. "Electoral Cycles, Investment, and Institutional Constraints in Developing Democracies," IAST Working Papers 22-129, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).

  5. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Rational ignorance, populism, and reform," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86371, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    Cited by:

    1. Xinyu Zhang & Yue Liao, 2023. "A Bibliometric and Visual Analysis of Populism Research (2000–2020)," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(4), pages 21582440231, December.
    2. Giray Gozgor, 2020. "The Role of Economic Uncertainty in Rising Populism in the EU," CESifo Working Paper Series 8499, CESifo.
    3. Brad R. Taylor, 2020. "The psychological foundations of rational ignorance: biased heuristics and decision costs," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 70-88, March.
    4. Guido Merzoni & Federico Trombetta, 2021. "A Note on Asymmetric Policies: Pandering and State-specific Costs of Mismatch in Political Agency," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis2102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).
    5. François Facchini & Louis Jaeck, 2021. "Populism and the rational choice model: The case of the French National Front," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(2), pages 196-228, May.
    6. Merzoni, Guido & Trombetta, Federico, 2022. "Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 132-143.
    7. Leyla D. Karakas & Devashish Mitra, 2021. "Electoral competition in the presence of identity politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(2), pages 169-197, April.
    8. Tinghua Yu & Elliott Ash, 2021. "Polarization and Political Selection," BCAM Working Papers 2105, Birkbeck Centre for Applied Macroeconomics.
    9. Heckelman, Jac C. & Wilson, Bonnie, 2019. "The growth-maximizing level of regulation: Evidence from a panel of international data," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 354-368.
    10. Giray Gozgor, 2022. "The role of economic uncertainty in the rise of EU populism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 229-246, January.
    11. Karakas, Leyla D. & Mitra, Devashish, 2020. "Believers vs. deniers: Climate change and environmental policy polarization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).

  6. Wolton, Stephane, 2016. "Lobbying, Inside and Out: How Special Interest Groups Influence Policy Choices," MPRA Paper 68637, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Benjamin J. McMichael, 2017. "The Demand for Healthcare Regulation: The Effect of Political Spending on Occupational Licensing Laws," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(1), pages 297-316, July.
    2. Nicola Mastrorocco & Marco Di Cataldo, 2018. "Organised Crime, Captured Politicians and the Allocation of Public Resources," Trinity Economics Papers tep0420, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2021.

  7. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2014. "Electoral Imbalances and their Consequences," MPRA Paper 68650, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Nov 2015.

    Cited by:

    1. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Rational ignorance, populism, and reform," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86371, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Stephane Wolton, 2019. "Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(3), pages 548-562, July.
    3. Denter, Philipp, 2019. "Campaign Contests," MPRA Paper 97395, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Avidit Acharya & Edoardo Grillo & Takuo Sugaya & Eray Turkel, 2019. "Dynamic Campaign Spending," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 601, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    5. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2013. "Rational Ignorance, Elections, and Reform," MPRA Paper 68638, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2015.

  8. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2013. "Rational Ignorance, Elections, and Reform," MPRA Paper 68638, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2015.

    Cited by:

    1. Morelli, Massimo & Nicolò, Antonio & Roberti, Paolo, 2022. "A Commitment Theory of Populism," CEPR Discussion Papers 16051, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Giray Gozgor, 2020. "The Role of Economic Uncertainty in Rising Populism in the EU," CESifo Working Paper Series 8499, CESifo.
    3. Brad R. Taylor, 2020. "The psychological foundations of rational ignorance: biased heuristics and decision costs," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 70-88, March.
    4. Guido Merzoni & Federico Trombetta, 2021. "A Note on Asymmetric Policies: Pandering and State-specific Costs of Mismatch in Political Agency," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis2102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).
    5. Blumenthal, Benjamin, 2021. "Political Agency and Legislative Subsidies with Imperfect Monitoring," SocArXiv ydfbs, Center for Open Science.
    6. Luciano Campos & Agustín Casas, 2020. "Rara Avis: Latin American populism in the 21st century," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4322, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    7. François Facchini & Louis Jaeck, 2021. "Populism and the rational choice model: The case of the French National Front," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(2), pages 196-228, May.
    8. Fabrizio Botti & Marcella Corsi, 2019. "La destra populista in Europa: una prospettiva economica (The populist right in Europe: An economic perspective)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 72(286), pages 133-147.
    9. Leyla D. Karakas & Devashish Mitra, 2021. "Electoral competition in the presence of identity politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(2), pages 169-197, April.
    10. Tinghua Yu & Elliott Ash, 2021. "Polarization and Political Selection," BCAM Working Papers 2105, Birkbeck Centre for Applied Macroeconomics.
    11. Marina Agranov & Ran Eilat & Konstantin Sonin, 2020. "A Political Model of Trust," Working Papers 2020-50, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    12. Morelli, Massimo & Sasso, Greg, 2020. "Bureaucrats under Populism," CEPR Discussion Papers 14499, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Giray Gozgor, 2022. "The role of economic uncertainty in the rise of EU populism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 229-246, January.
    14. Emilio Ocampo, 2019. "The Economic Analysis of Populism. A Selective Review of the Literature," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 694, Universidad del CEMA.

Articles

  1. Stephane Wolton, 2019. "Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(3), pages 548-562, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Montagnes, B. Pablo & Wolton, Stephane, 2019. "Mass Purges: Top-Down Accountability in Autocracy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(4), pages 1045-1059, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Toke S. Aidt & Jean Lacroix & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2022. "The Origins of Elite Persistence: Evidence from Political Purges in post-World War II France," Working Papers DT/2022/04, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
    2. Noah Buckley & Ora John Reuter & Michael Rochlitz & Anton Aisin, 2020. "Staying Out of Trouble: Criminal Cases Against Russian Mayors," Bremen Papers on Economics & Innovation 2013, University of Bremen, Faculty of Business Studies and Economics.
    3. David Karpa & Torben Klarl & Michael Rochlitz, 2021. "Artificial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Big Data," Papers 2111.00992, arXiv.org.
    4. Charles Crabtree & Holger L Kern & David A Siegel, 2020. "Cults of personality, preference falsification, and the dictator’s dilemma," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 409-434, July.
    5. Ricardo Nieva, 2021. "Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(2), pages 229-275, May.
    6. David Karpa & Torben Klarl & Michael Rochlitz, 2021. "Artificial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Big Data," Bremen Papers on Economics & Innovation 2108, University of Bremen, Faculty of Business Studies and Economics.

  3. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2019. "Campaign Cost and Electoral Accountability," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1-21, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Gaetan Fournier & Alberto Grillo & Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2023. "Strategic flip-flopping in political competition," Papers 2305.02834, arXiv.org.
    2. Tinghua Yu & Elliott Ash, 2021. "Polarization and Political Selection," BCAM Working Papers 2105, Birkbeck Centre for Applied Macroeconomics.

  4. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2018. "Rational ignorance, populism, and reform," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 119-135.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Howell, William G. & Wolton, Stephane, 2018. "The Politician’s Province," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 13(2), pages 119-146, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Howell, William & Shepsle, Kenneth & Wolton, Stephane, 2020. "Executive Absolutism: A Model," MPRA Paper 98221, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  6. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Citizens United: A Theoretical Evaluation," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(3), pages 567-574, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Alexander, Dan, 2021. "Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 163-185.
    2. Keith E. Schnakenberg & Ian R. Turner, 2021. "Helping Friends or Influencing Foes: Electoral and Policy Effects of Campaign Finance Contributions," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 88-100, January.

  7. Navin Kartik & Richard Van Weelden & Stephane Wolton, 2017. "Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(4), pages 958-970, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Qiaoxi, 2020. "Vagueness in multidimensional proposals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 307-328.
    2. Howell, William & Shepsle, Kenneth & Wolton, Stephane, 2020. "Executive Absolutism: A Model," MPRA Paper 98221, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Schmutzler, Armin & Hefti, Andreas & Liu, Shuo, 2020. "Preferences, Confusion and Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 14700, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Yasushi Asako, 2019. "Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting," Working Papers 1906, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    5. Maarten C. W. Janssen & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2017. "Mystifying but not misleading: when does political ambiguity not confuse voters?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 501-524, September.
    6. Coate, Stephen & Milton, Ross T., 2019. "Optimal fiscal limits with overrides," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 76-92.

  8. Carlo Prato & Stephane Wolton, 2016. "The Voters' Curses: Why We Need Goldilocks Voters," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 60(3), pages 726-737, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Li Hu & Anqi Li, 2018. "The Politics of Attention," Papers 1810.11449, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2019.
    2. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Rational ignorance, populism, and reform," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86371, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Salvatore Nunnari & Jan Zapal, 2017. "A Model of Focusing in Political Choice," Working Papers 599, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    4. Thanh Le & Erkan Yalcin, 2023. "Endogenous expropriation and political competition," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 313-332, March.
    5. Guido Merzoni & Federico Trombetta, 2021. "A Note on Asymmetric Policies: Pandering and State-specific Costs of Mismatch in Political Agency," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis2102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).
    6. Bräuninger, Thomas & Marinov, Nikolay, 2022. "Political elites and the “War on Truth’’," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    7. Eguia, Jon & Hu, Tai-Wei, 2022. "Voter Polarization and Extremism," Working Papers 2022-5, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    8. Merzoni, Guido & Trombetta, Federico, 2022. "Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 132-143.
    9. Tinghua Yu & Elliott Ash, 2021. "Polarization and Political Selection," BCAM Working Papers 2105, Birkbeck Centre for Applied Macroeconomics.
    10. Marina Agranov & Ran Eilat & Konstantin Sonin, 2020. "A Political Model of Trust," Working Papers 2020-50, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    11. Zerbini, Antoine, 2023. "The Case for Lobbying Transparency," SocArXiv w6vam, Center for Open Science.
    12. Anqi Li & Lin Hu, 2020. "Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized Information Aggregation," Papers 2009.03761, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    13. Gento Kato, 2020. "When strategic uninformed abstention improves democratic accountability," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 366-388, July.
    14. Devdariani, Saba & Hirsch, Alexander V., 2023. "Voter attention and electoral accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).

  9. Stephane Wolton, 2015. "Political conflicts, the role of opposition parties, and the limits on taxation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 570-587, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Konstantinos Matakos & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "When extremes meet: Redistribution in a multiparty model with differentiated parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(4), pages 546-577, October.
    2. Wolton, Stephane, 2016. "Lobbying, Inside and Out: How Special Interest Groups Influence Policy Choices," MPRA Paper 68637, University Library of Munich, Germany.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 10 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (7) 2014-02-15 2016-01-18 2016-01-18 2016-01-18 2018-02-05 2018-03-12 2019-07-08. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (6) 2014-02-15 2016-01-18 2016-01-18 2016-01-18 2018-02-05 2018-03-12. Author is listed
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 2015-06-20 2018-01-22 2018-02-05 2020-02-03
  4. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2015-06-20
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2014-02-15
  6. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2020-02-03
  7. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2018-03-12
  8. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2019-07-08
  9. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2020-02-03
  10. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2015-06-20
  11. NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (1) 2019-07-08
  12. NEP-SOG: Sociology of Economics (1) 2014-02-15

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Stephane Wolton should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.