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Cumulative knowledge in the social sciences: The case of improving voters' information

Author

Listed:
  • Izzo, Federica
  • Dewan, Torun
  • Wolton, Stephane

Abstract

wo (non-exhaustive) conditions are necessary for knowledge accumulation: unbiasedness and comparability. Research designs should be unbiased so that researchers obtain correct estimates of an underlying quantity. Empirical specifications should permit comparability so that researchers measure the same quantity across distinct studies. The first condition is covered by the causal revolution, the second is the object of this paper. Using the example of interventions providing additional information to voters, we highlight the difficulty to obtain comparability even after removing all concerns linked to external validity, all statistical noise, and all sources of bias. Commonly used specifications reach comparability only under specific, non-testable conditions. We propose several recommendations to restore comparability.

Suggested Citation

  • Izzo, Federica & Dewan, Torun & Wolton, Stephane, 2022. "Cumulative knowledge in the social sciences: The case of improving voters' information," MPRA Paper 112559, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:112559
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C18 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Methodolical Issues: General
    • C80 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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