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Corrupt Voting: Information and Electoral Accountability

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  • David K Levine
  • Federico Weinschelbaum
  • Felipe Zurita

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  • David K Levine & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita, 2026. "Corrupt Voting: Information and Electoral Accountability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 735347000000000074, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:735347000000000074
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Andrew Healy & Gabriel S. Lenz, 2014. "Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters Respond Primarily to the Election‐Year Economy," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(1), pages 31-47, January.
    3. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October.
    4. Frederico Finan & Maurizio Mazzocco, 2025. "Combating Political Corruption with Policy Bundles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 133(8), pages 2414-2461.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 2008. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 5, pages 67-93, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Benjamin Blumenthal, 2026. "Voter Information and Distributive Politics," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 293-312, May.
    7. Andrea Prat, 2005. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 862-877, June.
    8. Scott Ashworth & Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Amanda Friedenberg, 2017. "Accountability and Information in Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 95-138, May.
    9. Taylor C. Boas & F. Daniel Hidalgo & Marcus André Melo, 2019. "Norms versus Action: Why Voters Fail to Sanction Malfeasance in Brazil," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(2), pages 385-400, April.
    10. Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 183-198.
    11. David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi, 2020. "Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(10), pages 3298-3314, October.
    12. Benjamin Blumenthal, 2023. "Political Agency and Implementation Subsidies with Imperfect Monitoring," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(3), pages 775-800.
    13. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
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    15. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    16. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(2), pages 703-745.
    17. Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 183-198.
    18. Vincent Anesi & Peter Buisseret, 2022. "Making Elections Work: Accountability with Selection and Control," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 616-644, November.
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    21. Ashworth, Scott & Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan, 2014. "Is Voter Competence Good for Voters?: Information, Rationality, and Democratic Performance," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 108(3), pages 565-587, August.
    22. Germán Gieczewski & Christopher Li, 2024. "Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control: A Comment," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 19(3), pages 331-353, June.
    23. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
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