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Indirect executive accountability of prime ministers

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  • Akitaka Kamijo

Abstract

In parliamentary democracies, voters delegate the power of replacing the chief executive to the more knowledgeable legislators. The logic of costly signaling suggests that this indirect accountability helps voters ensure a competent prime minister (PM). I formally model this indirect executive accountability and show that while the incentive of the legislators in the PM’s party to signal their leader’s competence leads to increased voter welfare through two distinct mechanisms, the PM’s incentive to remain in office can eliminate this welfare effect. Specifically, if we consider that the PM can use their delegated authority and resources to maintain the support of the legislators in the PM’s party, the benefit of indirect executive accountability is in general diminished and may be even eliminated. I also examine how the clarity of the PM’s responsibility affects voter welfare and highlight that greater clarity is not always good for voters.

Suggested Citation

  • Akitaka Kamijo, 2026. "Indirect executive accountability of prime ministers," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 38(1), pages 28-55, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:38:y:2026:i:1:p:28-55
    DOI: 10.1177/09516298251334326
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    References listed on IDEAS

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