Can checks and balances discipline anti-pandering politicians?

In this paper, we show that a politician has an incentive of anti-pandering behavior to look competent and that anti-pandering not only prevents an efficient policy choice but also increases the possibility that the incompetent one is re-selected. Our main focus in this paper is to consider the separation of powers as a remedy to prevent anti-pandering behavior. We show that the separation of powers itself encourages anti-pandering rather than discourage it due to the bailout effect, but the judicial power can reduce anti-pandering by increasing the size of the sanction, although it cannot eliminate it completely. We also argue that the separation of powers has the correction effect and the replacement effect on social welfare, and show that the correction effect is always positive, while the replacement effect can be negative in the sense that the separation of powers can lower the probability that a competent politician is elected, especially when the legal sanction is harsh enough to discourage anti-pandering thereby dispensing with a separating equilibrium.