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Hierarchies and Promotions in Political Institutions: Accountability and Selection

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  • B. Pablo Montagnes

    (Department of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA)

  • Stephane Wolton

    (Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
    Center for Economic Policy Research, 75007 Paris, France)

  • Junyan Jiang

    (Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 420 W 118th St, New York, NY 10027, USA)

Abstract

Hierarchies are common in political settings. From judges to elected politicians, as well as from activists to bureaucrats, political agents compete for promotion to higher positions. This paper studies political tournaments and their impact on two aspects of political performance: accountability and selection. While larger tournaments discourage effort, they improve selection. We also discuss the optimal design of tournaments as a function of the principal’s objectives and the features of the environment. We find that tournaments of size two (such as two-candidate elections) are generally suboptimal. Our analysis also highlights that increased desirability of promotion always increases effort but can reduce the optimal tournament size under certain conditions. We also present a range of other comparative statics.

Suggested Citation

  • B. Pablo Montagnes & Stephane Wolton & Junyan Jiang, 2025. "Hierarchies and Promotions in Political Institutions: Accountability and Selection," Games, MDPI, vol. 16(4), pages 1-24, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:16:y:2025:i:4:p:34-:d:1694515
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Michels, Robert, 1915. "Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number michels1915.
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    6. Carlo Prato & Stephane Wolton, 2016. "The Voters' Curses: Why We Need Goldilocks Voters," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 60(3), pages 726-737, July.
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    8. Derek Clark & Christian Riis, 2001. "Rank-order tournaments and selection," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 167-191, June.
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