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The Effect of Leadership Transition on Government Expenditure: Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Juncheng Feng

    (School of Management Huazhong University of Science and Technology)

  • Rui Hao

    (Institute for Advanced Study Shenzhen University)

  • Yang Li

    (Department of Economics and Business Kalamazoo College)

  • Kezhong Zhang

    (School of Management Huazhong University of Science and Technology)

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of leadership transition on government expenditure, particularly the composition of the expenditure. Using the Chinese provincial-level data during the period 1992-2006, we find that the transition of provincial leaders seems to have no significant effect on expenditure composition, either in the short run or long run. However, if the origins of provincial leaders are taken into consideration, only when they are from the central ministries, the replacement of the party secretary is associated with significant changes in the composition of government expenditure in the long run. Moreover, in comparison with other regions, the composition of government expenditure in autonomous regions is more likely to remain stable in the short run when the replacement of provincial party secretary occurs.

Suggested Citation

  • Juncheng Feng & Rui Hao & Yang Li & Kezhong Zhang, 2012. "The Effect of Leadership Transition on Government Expenditure: Evidence from China," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 13(1), pages 91-112, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2012:v:13:i:1:n:3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Fenghua Pan & Fengmei Zhang & Shengjun Zhu & Dariusz Wójcik, 2017. "Developing by borrowing? Inter-jurisdictional competition, land finance and local debt accumulation in China," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 54(4), pages 897-916, March.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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