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Developing by borrowing? Inter-jurisdictional competition, land finance and local debt accumulation in China

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Listed:
  • Fenghua Pan

    (School of Geography, Beijing Normal University, P. R. China)

  • Fengmei Zhang

    (School of Geography, Beijing Normal University, P. R. China)

  • Shengjun Zhu

    (Department of Geography, Swansea University, UK)

  • Dariusz Wójcik

    (School of Geography and the Environment and St. Peter’s College, Oxford University, UK)

Abstract

Although the investment-oriented development model for economic growth adopted by Chinese governments has generated spectacular results, the risks of debt-financed urbanisation and economic development have recently become evident in mounting local debts that are undermining the financial system, triggering concerns with respect to local governments’ indebtedness, financial stability and sovereign risk in China. In this paper, we portray the uneven spatial and temporal dynamics of local government debt in China, and examine the ways in which it is intertwined with institutional, political and economic factors. Our analysis shows that while global and national economic conditions have resulted in a dramatic increase in local government debt, particularly in the late 2000s and the early 2010s, the spatial variation of local debt accumulation in China could be partly explained by two institutional factors: land finance and inter-jurisdictional competition. We argue that the behaviour of local governments may harm the long-term future of Chinese cities.

Suggested Citation

  • Fenghua Pan & Fengmei Zhang & Shengjun Zhu & Dariusz Wójcik, 2017. "Developing by borrowing? Inter-jurisdictional competition, land finance and local debt accumulation in China," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 54(4), pages 897-916, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:urbstu:v:54:y:2017:i:4:p:897-916
    DOI: 10.1177/0042098015624838
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Xing Su & Zhu Qian, 2020. "State Intervention in Land Supply and Its Impact on Real Estate Investment in China: Evidence from Prefecture-Level Cities," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-15, January.
    3. Jianxin Wu & Yanrui Wu & Bing Wang, 2018. "Local Government Debt, Factor Misallocation and Regional Economic Performance in China," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 26(4), pages 82-105, July.
    4. Huang, Zhonghua & Du, Xuejun, 2018. "Holding the market under the stimulus plan: Local government financing vehicles' land purchasing behavior in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 85-100.
    5. Rubo Zhao & Yixiang Tian & Ao Lei & Francis Boadu & Ze Ren, 2019. "The Effect of Local Government Debt on Regional Economic Growth in China: A Nonlinear Relationship Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(11), pages 1-22, May.

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