IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/chieco/v43y2017icp196-215.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Are local governments maximizing land revenue? Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Wang, Yuan
  • Hui, Eddie Chi-man

Abstract

This paper examines how political considerations affect local officials' revenue maximization behaviors in the context of urban land conveyance in China. Particularly, we analyze government intervention based on local officials' choice of two land auction types, namely, “English auction” and “two-stage auction”. The latter presumably serves as a tool of government intervention. We aim to address the research question: “Are local governments maximizing land revenue?” The major findings are threefold. First, for cities with higher housing prices, two-stage auctions are adopted more frequently than English auctions. In addition, land parcels in these “hot” cities adopt two-stage auctions more frequently during sensitive political events, suggesting that local officials respond positively to the real estate regulation policy from central government. Second, when city leaders are more incentivized to promote economic performance, they respond less positively to rises in housing prices. Third, such interventionist behavior results in a significantly depressed land price and housing price. Despite its intention of improving public welfare, this interventionism can susceptibly cause problems of misallocation and corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Yuan & Hui, Eddie Chi-man, 2017. "Are local governments maximizing land revenue? Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 196-215.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:43:y:2017:i:c:p:196-215
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2017.02.005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1043951X17300275
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Han, Li & Kung, James Kai-Sing, 2015. "Fiscal incentives and policy choices of local governments: Evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 89-104.
    2. Arellano, Manuel & Bover, Olympia, 1995. "Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 29-51, July.
    3. Qiang Fu, 2015. "When fiscal recentralisation meets urban reforms: Prefectural land finance and its association with access to housing in urban China," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 52(10), pages 1791-1809, August.
    4. Guido W. Imbens, 2015. "Matching Methods in Practice: Three Examples," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 50(2), pages 373-419.
    5. Nie, Huihua & Jiang, Minjie & Wang, Xianghong, 2013. "The impact of political cycle: Evidence from coalmine accidents in China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 995-1011.
    6. Hongbin Cai & J. Vernon Henderson & Qinghua Zhang, 2013. "China's land market auctions: evidence of corruption?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(3), pages 488-521, September.
    7. Lichtenberg, Erik & Ding, Chengri, 2009. "Local officials as land developers: Urban spatial expansion in China," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 57-64, July.
    8. Kahn, Matthew E., 2011. "Do liberal cities limit new housing development? Evidence from California," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 223-228, March.
    9. Peterson, George E., 2006. "Land leasing and land sale as an infrastructure-financing option," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4043, The World Bank.
    10. Huang, Haifang & Tang, Yao, 2012. "Residential land use regulation and the US housing price cycle between 2000 and 2009," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 93-99.
    11. Ren, Yu & Xiong, Cong & Yuan, Yufei, 2012. "House price bubbles in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 786-800.
    12. Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 2000. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 359-378.
    13. Du, Julan & Fang, Hongsheng & Jin, Xiangrong, 2014. "The “growth-first strategy” and the imbalance between consumption and investment in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 441-458.
    14. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 83-92, Fall.
    15. Hilber, Christian A.L. & Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, 2013. "On the origins of land use regulations: Theory and evidence from US metro areas," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 29-43.
    16. Ihlanfeldt, Keith R., 2007. "The effect of land use regulation on housing and land prices," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 420-435, May.
    17. Chenggang Xu, 2011. "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1076-1151, December.
    18. Jin, Hehui & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R., 2005. "Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1719-1742, September.
    19. K. Chau & S. Wong & C. Yiu & Maurice Tse & Frederik Pretorius, 2010. "Do Unexpected Land Auction Outcomes Bring New Information to the Real Estate Market?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 480-496, May.
    20. Liang Peng & Thomas Thibodeau, 2012. "Government Interference and the Efficiency of the Land Market in China," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(4), pages 919-938, November.
    21. Hongbin Cai & Hanming Fang & Lixin Colin Xu, 2011. "Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(1), pages 55-78.
    22. Pan, Jiun-Nan & Huang, Jr-Tsung & Chiang, Tsun-Feng, 2015. "Empirical study of the local government deficit, land finance and real estate markets in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 57-67.
    23. Yu, Jihai & Zhou, Li-An & Zhu, Guozhong, 2016. "Strategic interaction in political competition: Evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 23-37.
    24. Hamilton, Bruce W., 1978. "Zoning and the exercise of monopoly power," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 116-130, January.
    25. Joseph Gyourko & Raven Molloy, 2014. "Regulation and Housing Supply," NBER Working Papers 20536, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    26. Ran Tao & Fubing Su & Mingxing Liu & Guangzhong Cao, 2010. "Land Leasing and Local Public Finance in China’s Regional Development: Evidence from Prefecture-level Cities," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 47(10), pages 2217-2236, September.
    27. Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005. "Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1743-1762, September.
    28. Kok, Nils & Monkkonen, Paavo & Quigley, John M., 2014. "Land use regulations and the value of land and housing: An intra-metropolitan analysis," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 136-148.
    29. James Barlow, 1993. "Controlling the Housing Land Market: Some Examples from Europe," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 30(7), pages 1129-1149, August.
    30. Ding, Chengri & Niu, Yi & Lichtenberg, Erik, 2014. "Spending preferences of local officials with off-budget land revenues of Chinese cities," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 265-276.
    31. Jiang Xu & Anthony Yeh & Fulong Wu, 2009. "Land Commodification: New Land Development and Politics in China since the Late 1990s," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 890-913, December.
    32. Windmeijer, Frank, 2005. "A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 25-51, May.
    33. Wu, Guiying Laura & Feng, Qu & Li, Pei, 2015. "Does local governments’ budget deficit push up housing prices in China?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 183-196.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Land conveyance; Housing price; Career incentives; Local government; Land auction methods;

    JEL classification:

    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
    • H27 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other Sources of Revenue
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • R31 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:43:y:2017:i:c:p:196-215. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/chieco .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.