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Impacts of the political incentive for environmental protection on industrial land supply: Evidence from the cadre evaluation system reform in China

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  • Fugang Gao
  • Huub Ploegmakers
  • Erwin van der Krabben
  • Xiaoping Shi

Abstract

This paper investigates the implications of the political incentive system reform for industrial land supply. We study the stronger political incentive for environmental protection in China that resulted from the Cadre Evaluation System (CES) reform in 2013. Using the interaction of municipalities' pre‐CES environmental quality with the introduction of CES reform, we document dirty cities experience a significantly larger decline in industrial land supply following the reform. Also, the reform may have a larger impact on dirtier industries and wealthier cities, and our baseline results are mainly driven by the local leaders who are more likely to be promoted. Este artículo investiga las implicaciones de la reforma del sistema de incentivos políticos para la oferta de suelo industrial. Se estudió el fuerte incentivo político para la protección del medio ambiente en China que resultó de la reforma del Sistema de Evaluación de Cuadros (SEC) en 2013. Se utilizó la interacción de la calidad ambiental de los municipios antes del SEC con la introducción de la reforma del SEC para documentar que las ciudades contaminantes experimentan un descenso significativamente mayor de la oferta de suelo industrial tras la reforma. Además, la reforma puede tener un mayor impacto en las industrias más contaminantes y en las ciudades más acaudaladas, y los resultados de referencia de este estudio se basan principalmente en los líderes locales con más probabilidades de promoción. 本稿では、産業用地の供給のための政治的インセンティブ制度の改革の意義を検討する。2013年のカードル評価制度(Cadre Evaluation System:CES)改革の結果として生じた、中国の環境保護に対する強力な政治的インセンティブを研究した。CES前の自治体の環境の質CES改革の導入との相互作用を用いて、改革後の産業用地の供給が大幅に減少した汚染都市を記録した。また、改革は汚染産業や裕福な都市に対してより大きな影響を与える可能性があり、我々のベースラインの結果は、主に地位が上がる可能性の高い地域の指導者によりもたらされている。

Suggested Citation

  • Fugang Gao & Huub Ploegmakers & Erwin van der Krabben & Xiaoping Shi, 2022. "Impacts of the political incentive for environmental protection on industrial land supply: Evidence from the cadre evaluation system reform in China," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(4), pages 1001-1025, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:presci:v:101:y:2022:i:4:p:1001-1025
    DOI: 10.1111/pirs.12680
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