Balancing act: Economic incentives, administrative restrictions, and urban land expansion in China
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- Feng, Juan & Lichtenberg, Erik & Ding, Chengri, 2013. "Balancing Act: Economic Incentives, Administrative Restrictions, And Urban Land Expansion In China," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 149669, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
References listed on IDEAS
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- repec:gam:jsusta:v:10:y:2018:i:9:p:3077-:d:166474 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:gam:jsusta:v:10:y:2018:i:3:p:798-:d:136117 is not listed on IDEAS
- Yunfei Peng & Jing Qian & Fu Ren & Wenhui Zhang & Qingyun Du, 2016. "Sustainability of Land Use Promoted by Construction-to-Ecological Land Conversion: A Case Study of Shenzhen City, China," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(7), pages 1-16, July.
More about this item
KeywordsDecentralization; Dynamic balance policy; Fiscal federalism; Land allocation; Farmland preservation;
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- P35 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance
- O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
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