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A Commitment Theory of Populism

Author

Listed:
  • Morelli, Massimo
  • Nicolò, Antonio
  • Roberti, Paolo

Abstract

When voters' trust in politicians collapses, they demand simple policies that they can easily monitor. Disenchanted citizens therefore prefer committed delegates to politicians who propose themselves as competent policy makers but without a specific policy commitment (trustees). In a two-party competition, the unique asymmetric equilibrium is such that voters with lower interest for the common good select a committed delegate, while those with higher interest for the common good appoint a trustee. In this equilibrium, we show that the committed delegate also chooses all the strategies typically associated with populism in the literature. Hence, this paper puts forward a commitment theory of populism.

Suggested Citation

  • Morelli, Massimo & Nicolò, Antonio & Roberti, Paolo, 2022. "A Commitment Theory of Populism," CEPR Discussion Papers 16051, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16051
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Davide Cipullo & Barton E. Lee, 2025. "Economic Shocks and the Electoral Fortunes of Effective Legislators," CESifo Working Paper Series 11791, CESifo.
    3. Moriconi, Simone & Peri, Giovanni & Turati, Riccardo, 2025. "Analyzing political preferences of second-generation immigrants across the rural–urban divide," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    4. Gabriele Gratton & Barton E. Lee, 2023. "Drain the Swamp: A Theory of Anti-Elite Populism," Discussion Papers 2023-02, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    5. Luigi Guiso & Massimo Morelli & Tommaso Sonno & Helios Herrera, 2021. "The Financial Drivers of Populism in Europe," EIEF Working Papers Series 2112, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Sep 2021.
    6. Strobl, Martin & Sáenz de Viteri, Andrea & Rode, Martin & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2023. "Populism and inequality: Does reality match the populist rhetoric?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 1-17.
    7. Luca Vitale, 2022. "Populism and Kept Promises: Evidence from U.S. Congress Candidates and Legislators," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 22175, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    8. Sasso, Greg & Morelli, Massimo, 2021. "Bureaucrats under Populism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    9. repec:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp23204 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Jakob Vanschoonbeek, 2024. "The Spatial Political Economy of Discontent," Working Papers of VIVES - Research Centre for Regional Economics 750408, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), VIVES - Research Centre for Regional Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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