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Rudy Santore

Personal Details

First Name:Rudy
Middle Name:
Last Name:Santore
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psa591
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://econ.bus.utk.edu/santore.html
Terminal Degree:1998 Department of Economics; Ohio State University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
College of Business
University of Tennessee-Knoxville

Knoxville, Tennessee (United States)
http://econ.bus.utk.edu/

: 865-974-3100
(865) 974-1766
Knoxville - TN 37996
RePEc:edi:ecutkus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. David Bruner & Michael McKee & Rudy Santore, 2008. "Hand in the Cookie Jar: An Experimental Investigation of Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Fraud," Working Papers 08-05, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
  2. Santore, Rudy & Viard, Alan D., 1999. "Legal fee restrictions, moral hazard, and attorney profits," Working Papers 9912, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

Articles

  1. Cotten, Stephen J. & Santore, Rudy, 2012. "Contingent fee caps, screening, and the quality of legal services," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 317-328.
  2. H. David Robison & Rudy Santore, 2011. "Managerial Incentives, Fraud, and Monitoring," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 46(2), pages 281-311, May.
  3. Rudy Santore & Michael McKee & David Bjornstad, 2010. "Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient Licensing of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 167-183, February.
  4. Rudy Santore, 2009. "Gambling With Tax Dollars," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 295-304, July.
  5. David Bruner & Michael McKee & Rudy Santore, 2008. "Hand in the Cookie Jar: An Experimental Investigation of Equity-Based Compensation and Managerial Fraud," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 261-278, July.
  6. Michael McKee & Rudy Santore & Joel Shelton, 2007. "Contingent Fees, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rents: A Laboratory Experiment," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 253-273, June.
  7. Bruce, Donald & Santore, Rudy, 2006. "On optimal real estate commissions," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 156-166, June.
  8. Manfred Dix & Rudy Santore, 2003. "Campaign Contributions with Swing Voters," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 285-301, November.
  9. Dix, Manfred & Santore, Rudy, 2002. "Candidate ability and platform choice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 189-194, July.
  10. Santore, Rudy & Viard, Alan D, 2001. "Legal Fee Restrictions, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 549-572, October.
  11. Santore, Rudy & Robison, H. David & Klein, Yehuda, 2001. "Strategic state-level environmental policy with asymmetric pollution spillovers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 199-224, May.
  12. Santore, Rudy, 1999. "Pricing differentiated products with indifferent consumers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 43-52, January.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. David Bruner & Michael McKee & Rudy Santore, 2008. "Hand in the Cookie Jar: An Experimental Investigation of Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Fraud," Working Papers 08-05, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.

    Cited by:

    1. André De Palma & Nathalie Picard & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2009. "Individual and couple decision behavior under risk: Evidence on the dynamics of power balance," Working Papers hal-00418899, HAL.
    2. Galarza, Francisco, 2009. "Choices under Risk in Rural Peru," MPRA Paper 17708, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Drichoutis, Andreas & Lusk, Jayson, 2012. "Risk preference elicitation without the confounding effect of probability weighting," MPRA Paper 37762, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Chan, Chia-Ying & Chou, De-Wai & Lin, Jane-Raung & Liu, Feng-Ying, 2016. "The role of corporate governance in forecasting bankruptcy: Pre- and post-SOX enactment," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 166-188.
    5. Maier, Johannes & Rüger, Maximilian, 2010. "Measuring Risk Aversion Model-Independently," Discussion Papers in Economics 11873, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    6. Rudy Santore & Youping Li & Stephen Cotten, 2015. "Colluding with a conscience," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(3), pages 255-269, April.
    7. Rudy Santore & Martin Tackie, 2013. "Stock option contract design and managerial fraud," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1283-1289.
    8. Rojas-Nazar, U.A. & Cullen, R. & Gardner, J.P.A. & Bell, J.J., 2015. "Marine reserve establishment and on-going management costs: A case study from New Zealand," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 216-224.
    9. Andreas C. Drichoutis & Jayson L. Lusk, 2016. "What can multiple price lists really tell us about risk preferences?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 89-106, December.
    10. Kyota Eguchi, 2017. "Guilty Conscience And Incentives With Performance Assessment Errors," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 434-450, January.
    11. Rainer Andergassen, 2015. "Product market competition and fraud in a model of price competition with horizontally differentiated products," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(3), pages 1669-1674.

  2. Santore, Rudy & Viard, Alan D., 1999. "Legal fee restrictions, moral hazard, and attorney profits," Working Papers 9912, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

    Cited by:

    1. Bruce, Donald & Santore, Rudy, 2006. "On optimal real estate commissions," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 156-166, June.
    2. Hyde, Charles E. & Williams, Philip L., 2002. "Necessary costs and expenditure incentives under the English rule," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 133-152, August.
    3. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2012. "Contingent fees meet the British rule: an exploratory study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 499-510, March.
    4. Hyde, Charles E., 2006. "Conditional versus contingent fees: Litigation expenditure incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 180-194, June.

Articles

  1. Cotten, Stephen J. & Santore, Rudy, 2012. "Contingent fee caps, screening, and the quality of legal services," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 317-328.

    Cited by:

    1. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2014. "On discovery, restricting lawyers, and the settlement rate," DICE Discussion Papers 155, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    2. Andrew F. Daughtey & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2010. "Clients, Lawyers, Second Opinions, and Agency," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1009, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    3. Zamir Eyal & Medina Barak & Segal Uzi, 2014. "Who Benefits from the Uniformity of Contingent Fee Rates?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 357-387, January.
    4. Deffains, Bruno & Desrieux, Claudine, 2015. "To litigate or not to litigate? The impacts of third-party financing on litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 178-189.
    5. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2011. "Search, Bargaining, And Agency in the Market for Legal Services," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1106, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

  2. H. David Robison & Rudy Santore, 2011. "Managerial Incentives, Fraud, and Monitoring," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 46(2), pages 281-311, May.

    Cited by:

    1. David Bruner & Michael McKee & Rudy Santore, 2008. "Hand in the Cookie Jar: An Experimental Investigation of Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Fraud," Working Papers 08-05, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    2. Daniel Herold, 2017. "The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201752, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    3. Andergassen, Rainer, 2016. "Managerial compensation, product market competition and fraud," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-15.
    4. Chad Albrecht & Daniel Holland & Ricardo Malagueño & Simon Dolan & Shay Tzafrir, 2015. "The Role of Power in Financial Statement Fraud Schemes," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 131(4), pages 803-813, November.

  3. Rudy Santore & Michael McKee & David Bjornstad, 2010. "Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient Licensing of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 167-183, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2015. "Patent pools, litigation, and innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(3), pages 499-523, September.

  4. David Bruner & Michael McKee & Rudy Santore, 2008. "Hand in the Cookie Jar: An Experimental Investigation of Equity-Based Compensation and Managerial Fraud," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 261-278, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Michael McKee & Rudy Santore & Joel Shelton, 2007. "Contingent Fees, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rents: A Laboratory Experiment," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 253-273, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2014. "On discovery, restricting lawyers, and the settlement rate," DICE Discussion Papers 155, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    2. Bradley Graham & Jack Robles, 2014. "Moral hazard and legal services contracts," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 61(3), pages 219-230, September.
    3. Andrew F. Daughtey & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2010. "Clients, Lawyers, Second Opinions, and Agency," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1009, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    4. Zamir Eyal & Medina Barak & Segal Uzi, 2014. "Who Benefits from the Uniformity of Contingent Fee Rates?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 357-387, January.
    5. Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, 2010. "Revisiting the Debate over Attorneys' Contingent Fees: A Behavioral Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 245-288, January.
    6. Cotten, Stephen J. & Santore, Rudy, 2012. "Contingent fee caps, screening, and the quality of legal services," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 317-328.
    7. Baik Kyung Hwan, 2008. "Attorneys' Compensation in Litigation with Bilateral Delegation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 259-289, August.
    8. Christoph Engel & Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Bernd Irlenbusch & Sebastian Kube, 2009. "On Probation. An Experimental Analysis," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_38, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    9. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2011. "Search, Bargaining, And Agency in the Market for Legal Services," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1106, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

  6. Bruce, Donald & Santore, Rudy, 2006. "On optimal real estate commissions," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 156-166, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Randal Verbrugge & Thesia I. Garner, 2009. "Reconciling User Costs and Rental Equivalence: Evidence from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey," Working Papers 427, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
    2. Yao-Min Chiang, 2012. "A Flexible Franchise Fee Scheme in a BOT Project," International Real Estate Review, Asian Real Estate Society, vol. 15(1), pages 127-139.
    3. Larceneux, Fabrice & Lefebvre, Thomas & Simon, Arnaud, 2015. "What added value do estate agents offer compared to FSBO transactions? Explanation from a perceived advantages model," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 72-82.
    4. Jonathan Wiley & Justin Benefield & Marcus Allen, 2014. "Cyclical Determinants of Brokerage Commission Rates," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 196-219, January.

  7. Manfred Dix & Rudy Santore, 2003. "Campaign Contributions with Swing Voters," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 285-301, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Shaun M. Tanger & Richard Alan Seals Jr. & David N. Laband, 2011. "Does Bill Co-sponsorship Affect Campaign Contributions?: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives, 2000-2008," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2011-09, Department of Economics, Auburn University.

  8. Dix, Manfred & Santore, Rudy, 2002. "Candidate ability and platform choice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 189-194, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Aragonès, Enriqueta & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2017. "Voters' private valuation of candidates' quality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 121-130.
    2. Azrieli, Yaron, 2011. "Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 545-553.
    3. Fabian Gouret & Guillaume Hollard & Stéphane Rossignol, 2011. "An empirical analysis of valence in electoral competition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(2), pages 309-340, July.
    4. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Characterization of multidimensional spatial models of elections with a valence dimension," MPRA Paper 14513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Candidate valence in a spatial model with entry," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 05-2016, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    6. Dimitrios Xefteris, 2014. "Mixed equilibriums in a three-candidate spatial model with candidate valence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 101-120, January.
    7. Guillaume Hollard & Stéphane Rossignol, 2008. "An Alternative Approach to Valence Advantage in Spatial Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(3), pages 441-454, June.
    8. Hummel, Patrick, 2010. "On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 425-445, November.
    9. Meirowitz, Adam, 2006. "Electoral Contests," Papers 06-21-2007, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
    10. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2013. "Equilibrium in a discrete Downsian model given a non-minimal valence advantage and linear loss functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 150-153.
    11. Alexei Zakharov, 2009. "A model of candidate location with endogenous valence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 347-366, March.

  9. Santore, Rudy & Viard, Alan D, 2001. "Legal Fee Restrictions, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 549-572, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Kyung Hwan Baik & In-Gyu Kim, 2007. "Strategic Decisions On Lawyers' Compensation In Civil Disputes," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 854-863, October.
    2. Emons, Winand & Garoupa, Nuno, 2004. "The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Michael McKee & Rudy Santore & Joel Shelton, 2007. "Contingent Fees, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rents: A Laboratory Experiment," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 253-273, June.
    4. Bradley Graham & Jack Robles, 2014. "Moral hazard and legal services contracts," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 61(3), pages 219-230, September.
    5. Andrew F. Daughtey & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2010. "Clients, Lawyers, Second Opinions, and Agency," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1009, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    6. Kyung Hwan Baik & Jong Hwa Lee, 2013. "Endogenous Timing In Contests With Delegation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 2044-2055, October.
    7. Zamir Eyal & Medina Barak & Segal Uzi, 2014. "Who Benefits from the Uniformity of Contingent Fee Rates?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 357-387, January.
    8. Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, 2010. "Revisiting the Debate over Attorneys' Contingent Fees: A Behavioral Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 245-288, January.
    9. Baik Kyung Hwan, 2008. "Attorneys' Compensation in Litigation with Bilateral Delegation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 259-289, August.
    10. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    11. Graham, Brad & Robles, Jack, 2016. "Attorney fees in repeated relationships," Working Paper Series 5074, Victoria University of Wellington, School of Economics and Finance.
    12. Daniel L. Chen, 2015. "Can markets stimulate rights? On the alienability of legal claims," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(1), pages 23-65, March.
    13. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2011. "Search, Bargaining, And Agency in the Market for Legal Services," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1106, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

  10. Santore, Rudy & Robison, H. David & Klein, Yehuda, 2001. "Strategic state-level environmental policy with asymmetric pollution spillovers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 199-224, May.

    Cited by:

    1. BRECHET, Thierry & PERALTA, Susana, 2012. "Markets for tradable emission permits with fiscal competition," CORE Discussion Papers 2012054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Slim Ben Youssef, 2009. "Transboundary pollution, R&D spillovers and international trade," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 43(1), pages 235-250, March.
    3. Ian A. MacKenzie,, 2008. "On the Sequential Choice of Tradable Permit Allocations," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 08/83, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    4. Odd Godal & Bjart Holtsmark, 2010. "International emissions trading with endogenous taxes," Discussion Papers 626, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    5. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2010. "International Carbon Emissions Trading and Strategic Incentives to Subsidize Green Energy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3083, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. BRECHET, Thierry & PERALTA, Susana, 2007. "The race for polluting permits," CORE Discussion Papers 2007027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. MacKenzie, Ian A., 2011. "Tradable permit allocations and sequential choice," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 268-278, January.
    8. Harrie A. A Verbon & Cees A. Withagen, 2010. "Do Permit Allocations Matter?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3236, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Aoyama Naoto & Emilson Silva, 2008. "Correlated Pollutants, Interregional Redistribution and Labor Attachment in a Federation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(1), pages 111-131, September.
    10. Harrie A. A Verbon & Cees A. Withagen, 2005. "Tradable Emission Permits in a Federal System," CESifo Working Paper Series 1482, CESifo Group Munich.
    11. Gersbach, Hans & Hummel, Noemi, 2016. "A development-compatible refunding scheme for a climate treaty," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 139-168.

  11. Santore, Rudy, 1999. "Pricing differentiated products with indifferent consumers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 43-52, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Okura Mahito, 2010. "An Equilibrium Analysis of the Insurance Market with Horizontal Differentiation," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 1-24, July.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (1) 2008-04-12
  2. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2008-04-12

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