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Individual and couple decision behavior under risk: Evidence on the dynamics of power balance

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  • André De Palma

    (ENS Cachan - École normale supérieure - Cachan, Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Nathalie Picard

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - Université de Cergy Pontoise - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Anthony Ziegelmeyer

    (Max Planck Institut, Strategic Interaction Group)

Abstract

This paper reports results of an experiment designed to analyze the link between risky decisions made by couples and risky decisions made separately by each spouse. We estimate both the spouses and the couples' degrees of risk aversion, we assess how the risk preferences of the two spouses aggregate when they make risky decisions and we shed light on the dynamics of the decision process that takes place when couples make risky decisions. We find that, far from being fixed, the balance of power within the household is malleable. In most couples, men have, initially, more decision-making power than women but women who ultimately implement the joint decisions gain more and more power over the course of decision making.

Suggested Citation

  • André De Palma & Nathalie Picard & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2009. "Individual and couple decision behavior under risk: Evidence on the dynamics of power balance," Working Papers hal-00418899, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00418899 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00418899
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    Keywords

    Risk; Balance of power; Experiments; Household decision-making; Risk.;

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