A development-compatible refunding scheme for a climate treaty
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More about this item
KeywordsClimate change mitigation; Refunding scheme; International agreements; Developing countries;
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
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