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On the Sequential Choice of Tradable Permit Allocations

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Abstract

This paper investigates the sequential announcement of domestic emissions caps by regulators in a federal or international-based tradable pollution permit market for a transboundary pollutant. A leader-follower framework is used to analyse the consequences of regulators sequentially announcing domestic allocation caps. We find the sequential choice of domestic allocation caps is sub-optimal and depends on the follower's reaction to the leader's choice. Furthermore, the marginal damage and the degree to which allocations are substitutes or complements affects whether the leader changes from being a net permit buyer (seller) of permits to a seller (buyer).

Suggested Citation

  • Ian A. MacKenzie,, 2008. "On the Sequential Choice of Tradable Permit Allocations," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 08/83, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  • Handle: RePEc:eth:wpswif:08-83
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Balistreri, Edward J. & Hillberry, Russell H. & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2010. "Trade and welfare: Does industrial organization matter?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 85-87, November.
    2. Gersbach, Hans & Winkler, Ralph, 2011. "International emission permit markets with refunding," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 759-773, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Initial allocation; international tradable permit market; leader-follower;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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